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**The European Union Refugee Crisis:
A Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating
Migration with an Emphasis on Trade**

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The EU Refugee Crisis: A Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Migration with an Emphasis on Trade

Eric Little¹

Introduction

A refugee is a person who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape War, persecution, or natural disaster. Since 1999, the European Union has worked towards creating a common European Asylum scheme and efforts have been dramatically ramped up in the wake of a drastic influx of incoming refugees resulting from the ongoing civil wars in Syria and overall instability and conflicts found throughout the Middle East and areas of North Africa. The European Union has been a major destination point for refugees and the increased influx in asylum seekers have overwhelmed the European Union, especially member states like Greece, Italy, and those in the southeast. Due to geographic positioning there is an unequal burden placed on the south in comparison to the northern states. This unequal burden primarily stems from EU asylum law that places the responsibility of asylum seekers to the states of origin, leading to the southern states housing and responsible for a much larger number of refugees than states in the north. There has been mass disagreement throughout the European Union on a coordinated effort to solve the problem. Relocation has long been on the reform agenda, with states unable to compromise on the best way to equally distribute the population of refugees throughout the European Union as to ease the burden on the southern states. However, very little progress has been made on the issue, leaving many refugees that have made it to Europe in a state of flux without access to the care and necessities they need.

The relocation reform has hit a standstill in large regards due to growing anti-Islamic sentiments and growing support for right wing anti-immigration parties throughout the European Union. Many of these parties argue that borders should be closed on grounds of national security concerns and economic burdens that refugee's place upon the incoming member states.

This paper seeks to explore avenues that the European Union can explore to alleviate the migration crises both inside and outside the confines of European regulatory law. EU common law has left substantial problems for both refugees and member states, and while reform is possible and seems likely, it is unlikely it will happen in a timeframe to have any substantial impact on the current crises. It is for this reason this paper will seek to explore policies and reforms to mitigate the current problem in the long run outside the confines of the popular relocation scheme reforms. While the likelihood of any immediate solution having a substantial effect on the current migration crisis, a comprehensive approach to the issue can help mitigate the effects of the current crisis, and prove effective in preventing the next migration wave. This paper seeks to analyze the current proposals to reform the common European Asylum framework, as well as explore external actions the European Union can take to mitigate the influx of Refugees, primarily through a

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retooling of the European Union Mediterranean Strategy, and emphasizing trade as a viable and strategic long-term solution.

EU Common Policy

In the European Union common, asylum and migration law takes the form of three directives and one common regulation as outlined by the European Union. A directive is a legal act of the European Union, which requires member states to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving that result. It can be distinguished from regulations which are self-executing and do not require any implementing measures. The directives and regulations that outline the standards for migration take the form of these four specifically:

-The Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of non-EU nationals and stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection²;

(Can be located in the Official Journal of the European Union under: L337/9)

-The Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection³;

(Can be located in the Official Journal of the European Union under: L 180/60)

-The Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection⁴;

(Can be located in the Official Journal of the European Union under: L 180/96)

-The Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless person.⁵

(Can be located in the Official Journal of the European Union under: L 180/31)

The Qualifications Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive, outline procedures and standards for which persons qualify for international protection and procedures for which protection can be granted or withdrawn. The directive that has presented the biggest hurdles in regards to the current migration crises is

² Official Journal of the European Union. " REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013. "Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person." 26 June, 2013.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:en:PDF>

³ Official Journal of the European Union. "Directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast)." 26 June, 2013.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032>

⁴ Official Journal of the European Union. "Directive laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast)." 26 June, 2013

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033>

⁵ Official Journal of the European Union. " Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)." 26 June, 2013

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604>

The Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU, which lays down the standards for the reception of applicants for international protection.

Problems Stemming from Secondary Movement

The large-scale, uncontrolled arrival of migrants and asylum seekers has put a strain not only on many Member States' asylum systems, but also on the Common European Asylum System as a whole. The volume and concentration of arrivals has exposed in particular the weaknesses of the Dublin System, which establishes the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application based primarily on the first point of irregular entry. The differing treatment of asylum seekers across Member States has further exacerbated the problem of irregular secondary movements. In particular this problem is seen most in Greece, and Italy where officials and resources have been overwhelmed leaving to a failure on behalf of the Greek government to put in due process in and provide the proper facilities and processing procedures due to lack of resources. The failures and burden on these states has led to asylum seekers finding illegal transport further north where reception conditions are much fairer and applicants have a higher chance of having their applications for asylum accepted.

If any member state in the European Union were representative of the flaws the Dublin Accords present, it would be Greece. Shortcomings of the Greek asylum and reception systems have been highlighted in numerous reports from internationally recognized organizations including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)⁶. These reports not only highlighted shortcomings within the Greek asylums system but also brought to fruition legitimate grounds for suspending the Dublin mechanism under European human-rights law. For example, between 2007 and 2008, refugee status was granted to less than one percent of first-time applicants. In addition to those low recognition rates, these reports found that asylum seekers faced significant barriers to submitting applications for asylum including a lack of facilities to apply outside Athens, long wait times amid a chronic shortage of capacity, lack of interpretation services, and lack of information about application procedures. Moreover, inoperative appeal procedures lead to applicants being returned to Turkey and at risk for refoulement.

The UNHRC's report on the Dublin Regulations has called for Member States to utilize Dublin's 'sovereignty clause' to take responsibility for cases that would otherwise be transferred to Greece. This was recommended as a "last resort" option as it should still be on the responsibility of states to reform their respective systems rather than pass off legal responsibilities. Concurrently the European Commission began infringement proceedings against the Greek government for denying Dublin returnees access to asylum procedures (the Commission's case was later withdrawn). Recently countries such as Germany has suspended transfers of migrants and have accepted large amounts and have vowed to process their respective claims rather than transferring them back to states such as Greece.

By 2011, several cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) were requesting a halt to Dublin transfers. In January 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR handed down a critical judgment in *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece*. The result has led to a suspension of transfers to Greece by most Member States. In the decision, the court had ruled

⁶ United Nations Human Rights Council "The Dublin Regulation." *UNHRC*. Accessed: 4 October 2016. <http://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.pdf>

that Belgium had violated the applicant's rights by returning him to Greece, where detention and reception conditions put him at risk of inhumane and degrading treatment. In addition, the ruling held that Belgium had a responsibility to verify that the applicant's rights would be respected by Greece before transferring an applicant, as given the case Belgian authorities knew that conditions in Greece at the time would have amounted to a violation of these rights.⁷

The underlying reasoning of the M.S.S. decision was echoed in the CJEU's decision in the cases of N.S. v. the United Kingdom and M.E. v. Ireland. The court held that Member States may not carry out transfers in cases 'where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment'.⁸

The N.S./M.E. decision has led to a near-universal halt in Dublin transfers to Greece. Furthermore, the language of the decision was incorporated in a new provision in Dublin III prohibiting transfers to states with systemic flaws in their asylum systems. While these are welcome revisions to the Dublin Regulations, they still have gaping systematic shortcomings. The most glaring being the failure on states to apply these decisions to asylum cases outside of Greece, specifically to states well under capacity such as Italy. Italy receives by far the most incoming requests 12,358 with the second highest state receiving 4,725. These influxes of incoming request can be correlated with the recognition rates as countries such as Italy, are statistically speaking well below the average rate of recognition compared to the rest of the European Union accepting around 22 percent of applicants with the EU average at a 56 percent acceptance rate.⁹

Solutions for Reform within the EU

The argument we are presented with in terms of a solution to the reception conditions problem is one that debates on whether the answer is to reform through a reform of the Directive or rather scrap the directive all together and harmonize procedures through regulation. A regulation is the most direct form of EU law; specifically a regulation is "a binding legislative act. It must be applied in its entirety across the EU"¹⁰. As soon as it is passed, it has binding legal force throughout every MS, on par with national laws. Regulations are analogous to domestic legislation. This is why they are a good illustration of a legal instrument that can lead to uniformity of laws throughout the EU, like 'rules' that set out the precise content. In the adoption there is no flexibility left for the MS. Regulations simplify matters in that they enable immediate application and can be directly invoked before courts by interested parties. They confer rights on individuals that the national courts are bound to protect. Unlike a directive, it is integrated both vertically and horizontally. For those who are bound by or benefit from a regulation, they guarantee union-wide equal laws. In contrast,

⁷ Triandafyllidou, Anna and Angeliki Dimitriadi. "Migration Management at the Outposts of the European Union: The Case of Italy's and Greece's Borders." 2013. *Griffith Law Review* 22, no. 3: 598-618.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1549243084?accountid=14585>.

⁸ Den Heijer, Maarten. "Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform." October 2012. *Common Market Law Review* 49, no. 5: 1735-1753.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1112910711?accountid=14585>.

⁹ "Dublin statistics on countries responsible for asylum application." *European Council*. March 2014.

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Dublin_statistics_on_countries_responsible_for_asylum_application_-_Main_statistical_findings

¹⁰ "Regulations, Directives, and other Acts." *European Union*. Accessed: 4 October 2016.

https://europa.eu/european-union/law/legal-acts_en

directives are goals and standards that are to be met by each member state by a certain time, and each member state has free reign to implement laws and procedures how they want in order to meet the directives set out.

The problem with the directives outlined in the receptions conditions standard is the conflicts stemming from the Dublin Accords and the unequal burden placed on bordering exterior member states, primarily Greece, Italy, and the Balkan States. As we have seen, it is harder for these states to meet the directives due to the disproportional burdens placed on their respective asylum systems as the result of a much higher influx of asylum seekers than those member states geographically farther north.

It is for this reason that if reforms to the common European system are to be effective, these reforms need to be implemented either through revision of current regulation or a complete overhaul of the Dublin Regulations and implementation of a new regulation. The proposed Dublin IV regulation is not the answer. The proposals in the reforms of the Dublin Regulation fail to address the key structural deficiencies that have plagued previous installments of the Dublin regulations. Rather than addressing the problems, many of the proposals would in theory actually exasperate the current problems. While these proposals are changes, they are not good changes. The proposed revisions sacrifice human rights and quality standards of reception in favor of faster application processing times. These do not address the key flaws in the system, primarily irregular entry criterion and responsibilities on the States of application specifically the "Gatekeeper Responsibilities," are not really corrected under the "corrective" mechanism in the Dublin IV proposal.¹¹

In response to the release of the proposed reforms to the Dublin Regulation, the European Parliament has recommended the implementation of a new asylum system with three proposed frameworks, including a free choice model, a stripped-down "Dublin minus" system similar to the one in the Dublin IV proposal, which might be politically easier to agree and would simplify proceedings to a great extent, but would leave a number of current problems standing; and thirdly a more refined "limited choice" model combining "Dublin minus" with greatly expanded family criteria and with the possibility for the applicant to choose between places made available by "under-burdened" States.¹²

These proposals stand in contrast to the very state centric "heavy system" which has been in place under the Dublin Regulation. Migration towards the European Union is primarily driven by push factors, while the intra-regional distribution among destination States is mostly influenced by "structural" pull factors, with asylum policy playing a subordinate role. In other words, the idea that replacing Dublin with a more liberal system might attract more protection seekers to Europe, which the Commission presents as an established fact, is actually a dubious hypothesis – one that should not be allowed to rule the EU Asylum Policy without much stronger evidence to support. With this in mind and in terms of effectiveness, the free choice model and the limited choice model present the greatest opportunities for success.

¹¹ "The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation: Study for the Libe Committee conducted under the Directorate-General of International Affairs" 2016. *European Parliament*.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571360/IPOL_STU\(2016\)571360_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571360/IPOL_STU(2016)571360_EN.pdf)

¹² "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)" 2016. *European Commission*.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/dublin_reform_proposal_en.pdf

Free Choice Model:

The free choice model is a model that is in direct opposition of the policies outlined in the Dublin Regulations. With this model refugees and migrants, would not be restricted to applying for asylum in the state of initial entry. Under this proposed model, refugees would be able to apply for asylum in the state of their choice. Under this model, refugees would have more rights and power in choosing where to apply for asylum. The theory behind this model is that refugees will be able to apply in the states most efficient in processing applications, and by virtue would ease the overburdened Border States such as Greece and, Italy because refugees would be able to move freely towards states with more migrant friendly policies and capabilities to effectively and fairly process applications. A free choice model would in theory have greater long-term economic benefits than more restrictive immigration policies. Restrictive policies and border enforcements encourages a selective process increasing the amount of skilled workers and diluting the capital share of the skilled worker. In contrast, with a free choice model, refugees would be able to apply for asylum in states more apt to fairly process applications. This, in turn, would bring up the average of accepted refugees and by default increase the amount of unskilled workers in the state, effectively raising the capital stock of the skilled worker majority of the European Union and in the long term boosting the support and sustainability of the welfare state.¹³

While in theory a free choice model would be effective, it is uncertain of the factors necessary for this model to be effective. One condition of this theory is that states will be in competition to conduct the best asylum processing procedures. It is assumed that refugees will choose states that provide the most just and efficient application processing, in practice however, this seems less likely as state incentive in the current political climate is to limit the amounts of refugees in their respective states. Given the rise of right wing and anti-immigration parties, the current political climate would dictate for states to make themselves less attractive to refugees to limit the “pull factors” and amount of asylum applicants. Survey results suggest that in virtually all the contemporary West European countries, a majority of voters are opposed to the idea of the multicultural society.¹⁴ This means that if an anti-immigration party has success and the issue becomes salient, all other parties have incentives to take up a restrictive policy position – not just the niche party’s immediate competitors. A left-wing party may attempt to reduce its losses to anti- immigration challengers by withdrawing its support for the ideal of the multicultural society.

The current political climate does not dictate competition for the most effective processing of refugees. Rather, it dictates the opposite, which would dilute the application process as a whole, as the political climate does not dictate a race to the top. It rather encourages a race to becoming the least attractive, which means not reforming asylum procedures and conditions for the betterment of the refugee, which is the goal of migration reform in the European Union.

¹³ Russo, G. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion." December 2011. *Economics of Governance*, 12(4), 325-351. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0098-y>

¹⁴ Van Spanje, J." Contagious parties: Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties' immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe." 2010 *Party Politics*, 16(5), 563.

Limited Choice Model:

The other viable proposal would be the limited choice model. With this model, migrants would be able to select to apply for asylum from a list of pre-selected options, allowing the Governments to have more control over the distribution of refugees, and guiding the flow of refugees to states most capable, as well as increasing the rights of the refugee by giving more choice than being limited to the states of initial entry. This model would serve to give more control to the EU in regards to controlling the distribution of refugees, allowing the pressure to be taken off the Border States. It could forward the agenda for refugee quota's and allow for better monitoring and more effective placement of refugees, for both the refugees' and the European Union member states as a whole. The biggest hurdles to such a model being implemented would be the agreement on quotas, how refugees are transferred, and the criteria for which refugee applications are processed i.e. What determines which states a refugee has to choose from for applying for asylum?

This reform would prove to be the most effective of reforms. It would give states the control they desire and would increase the rights of the refugee, by increasing their choices and allowing states to use the money gained from the eliminations of the former system to improving the reception conditions in the designated areas that this proposal would require. The hurdles to this proposal in addition to the hurdles resulting from agreement on legal language and quotas would be stem from sheer technical assistance. In order for this plan to be effective, it would require assistance in securing efficient and humane routes from origin countries, to destination countries, in the European Union. I believe the solution to this hurdle would be to invest in partnerships with allies in the Middle East, primarily Jordan whom houses the largest majority of refugees, in establishing reception sites in third countries and providing the logistical and technical support to provide legal pathways to destination countries from these third countries of origin. This would ease the pressure off the European Union in regards to the pressures of handling asylum applications, and provide an exterior control regarding controlling the flow and tracking of refugees.

Migration Management through the Mediterranean Strategy and Trade

While these proposed reforms will certainly have a beneficial effect on the refugee crises, they certainly will not have an immediate impact and they should not be viewed as immediate solutions. While these reforms could lead to effective change it will not lead to effective mitigation of exponentially increasing waves of refugee migration rather they are structural changes designed to better handle the larger influx of refugees. They do not address the root problem and while the improvements are necessary, it is not a solution, which will effectively cause sustainable relief. In order for the European Union to cause effective and sustainable change, the European Union should place equal focus on addressing the roots of the crises and work towards limiting the influx of refugees by bolstering its relations with its Mediterranean allies through its Neighborhood policy and the Mediterranean Partnership, through states such as Jordan, through Macro Financial Assistance in the short term and liberalization of trade in the long term through the Mediterranean Agenda and Union for the Mediterranean.

The Union for the Mediterranean promotes economic integration across 15 neighbors to the EU's south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans region. Formerly known as the Barcelona Process, cooperation was re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean. It was an opportunity to make relations more operational with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects with relevance for those living in the region. Projects address areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration,

education and social affairs.¹⁵ To date, the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean have failed to live up to their outlined goals, and while there are mechanisms in place for both parties to benefit, the EU has hedged any potential gains stemming from resistance to lift agricultural and labor intensive sector protectionist policies¹⁶. Given the recent migration climate, the EU would be wise to ease those restrictions and let their Mediterranean Partners prosper in exchange for a mitigated flow of refugees in the European Union, which will later be discussed in detail.

An example of such a partner in the Mediterranean and a member of the Union of the Mediterranean is Jordan. Jordan is a small Mediterranean state with a GDP of 33 billion dollars and a population estimated to be around 8 million people resulting in a GDP per capita of roughly 5 thousand dollars¹⁷. Jordan houses the largest proportion of refugees in the world. As of November 2015, over 633,000 persons from Syria had sought refuge in Jordan since 2011, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).¹⁸ In contrast, the European Union has combined GDP of 16.3 Trillion dollars and a population of roughly 510 million people resulting in a GDP per capita of around 35,000 dollars. The European Union has a GDP per capita roughly 7 times the size of Jordan yet proportionally Jordan houses 48 percent more refugees per person, yet has 6 times as less money per person to do it¹⁹.

Jordan is only one example of the states in the Mediterranean experiencing influxes of refugees; in many cases, refugees migrate to Europe after attempting to settle in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa. In many cases, refugees are unable to settle due to economic reasons and in some cases political and social unrest in the states. These factors combined leave refugees with daunting choice of staying in an area where chance of survival seems slim due to these economic and political conditions, or make the dangerous and life-threatening journey to cross the Mediterranean Sea into the EU states of Greece, Italy and the Balkans. Researchers found that increased migration across the Mediterranean was closely associated with difficulties in securing access to protection or work, due to newly introduced visas as well as cascading border closures in the countries people had previously travelled to. Consequently, refugees and migrants are channeled towards Turkey and ultimately other Mediterranean States - where they often could not secure a status or livelihood - and use smugglers to get out of these countries and find safety elsewhere.²⁰

The EU has an opportunity to cooperate on the migration issue, and this cooperation can be extended and reinforced through trade and economic development, this type of cooperation could potentially reduce influx of migrants and refugees by improving economic and employment conditions as well as overall improvement in the overall stability of the political climate in the region. If the EU were to refocus its efforts and achieve the goals they have outlined in the Union for the Mediterranean, then they would be able to not only tackle the migration issue, from an economic perspective, but also mitigate many of the other factors leading to secondary movement for migrants such as political and social unrest and stability.

¹⁵ "Union for the Mediterranean: Mission." *Union for the Mediterranean*. Accessed: 11 October 2016.

<http://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/>

¹⁶ Péridy, Nicolas and Nathalie Roux. "Why are the Trade Gains from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership so Small?" June 2012. *Journal of World Trade* 46, no. 3: 571-595.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1035328792?accountid=14585>.

¹⁷ "Country at a Glance: Jordan." Accessed: November 16, 2016. *World Bank*.

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan>

¹⁸ "Syrian Refugee Response." 04 December, 2016. *United Nations Human Rights Council*.

<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107>

¹⁹ "European Union." Accessed: 16 November 2016. *World Bank*. <http://data.worldbank.org/region/european-union>

²⁰ Betts, Alexander. "Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 18, no. 3-4 (09, 2006): 652.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/214010161?accountid=14585>.

While this strategy would obviously take cooperation from both sides and a strong persistent commitment to the goals of the agenda, as given the Jordan Situation, there are clearly motivating factors for cooperation on both sides to work to improve the situation and seriously build upon the framework for which they have conceived.

While, at first glance, the migration-asylum nexus appears to complicate the prospects for inter-agency collaboration, it may well ultimately improve the prospects for inter-state cooperation. The migration nexus brings light to perceived linkages being created between the motives underlying managed migration, on one end and the other areas such as durable solutions, protection capacity and tackling root causes, on the other. These linkages have provided incentives for cooperation to emerge in the regions of origin in the Mediterranean. Ultimately, it may be the desire to control and manage migration that leads to positive outcomes because of this perceived linkage' across issue-areas²¹.

The linkages stemming from the common issue of migration can extend beyond that into areas of trade and other strategic partnerships. Through Macro financial Assistance, the European Union has already aligned their interests in slowing the flow of migration into Mediterranean states and Europe. Through economic relief packages and trade non-European Union member states in the Mediterranean and North Africa can bolster economic growth because the increased levels of investments allow for more resources to house refugees and helps mitigates the need for refugees to move onwards due to economic burdens and lack of adequate resources in this region. The European Union has implemented this strategy on a small scale for example having given Jordan roughly 500 million dollars in Macro financial Assistance to date²².

However, Macro Financial Assistance only offers short term relief, in order for a sustainable effective solution, a more comprehensive approach would be to strengthen and further liberalize trade with its partners in the Mediterranean. Increasing trade with partners in the Mediterranean would increase the amount of unskilled jobs in the Mediterranean region where a majority of migrants and refugees are housed as they search for jobs. With reduced barriers to trade, capital would be more freely to flow from the European Union to the Mediterranean.

In New Economic Geography models, which build upon the Heckscher- Olin models of international trade, simulation results have shown that capital mobility narrows the wage difference across countries. The real wage in the labor abundant country is even slightly higher than that in the other country when the trading cost is sufficiently low. When both mobile capital and agricultural trade costs are involved in the model, the simulation results show that the countries with abundant labor have much higher real wage than the other country²³. If this were the case in terms of reducing trade barriers with the Mediterranean, real wages would rise in the region as they are the more labor abundant even more so with the influx of refugees, a large unskilled labor force, in addition the increased demand for products would raise the number of jobs available in the area, lowering unemployment.

²¹ Betts, Alexander. "Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin." September 2006. *International Journal of Refugee Law* 18, no. 3-4: 652.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/214010161?accountid=14585>.

²² "EU-Jordan: Commission Proposes further 200 Million Euros in Macro-Financial Assistance." Jun 29, 2016. *Targeted News Service*.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1800304103?accountid=14585>.

²³ Li, Yao. "Capital mobility, diminishing returns and wage inequality." 2012. *Journal of International Trade & Economic Development* 21, no. 3: 321-345.

In regards for the European Union, a trade deal would net two effects in theory. The first effect being lower prices on final products, as the costs of inputs would be lower allowing for a higher marginal product of capital, in the more capital-intensive final manufacturing production. The second effect would be a decrease in the number of migrants seeking refuge in the European Union. A primary reason for the migration of refugees from the Mediterranean into the European Union and migration from the Mediterranean to Turkey and then into the European Union is the inability to secure a livelihood in these regions. With increased trade, more jobs would be available to refugees, as unskilled labor employment would expand given the expansion of the agricultural industries and other labor-intensive industries in which the Mediterranean holds a substantial comparative advantage. In addition to the expansion of employment opportunities for refugees, such liberalization of trade would also coincide with higher wages in the more labor-intensive industries, which would lower the incentive for secondary movement. The projected increases in GDP would allow states in the region more resources to distribute in order to improve the welfare of refugees and strengthen the necessary institutions to provide political stability, and improve the level of protection received by Refugees as discussed previously by the increased linkages across issue areas.²⁴

How a Mediterranean Trade Centric Solution May Impact Negotiations with Turkey

To date the European Union has largely focused its effort on migration mitigation through negotiations for refugee assistance with Turkey (holding and returning denied refugees). For decades, Turkey has been attempting to strong arm their way into the European Union and the latest migration crises has led to leverage for Turkey to further their bid. While Turkey would be a strategic partner in the Middle East for the European Union, acceptance into the EU would be met with great criticism, given Turkey's political climate and failure to meet the democratic standards for which the EU expects and requires of its member states. In current negotiations Turkey is attempting to further its integration with the EU, by holding Visa free travel for Turkish Citizens as a key bargaining chip in regards to cooperation with the EU in any negotiations regarding Turkish assistance to aiding the EU's current refugee crises.²⁵ In General terms Turkey has leveraged Turkish aid in regarding the holding of refugees and aiding in the return of denied refugees in a proposed exchange for visa free travel throughout the European Union for Turkish passport holders. Given the EU-Turkish customs Union, this deal would put the state on level with EEA members such as Switzerland, and Iceland.

In recent events, the European Union has expressed desire to put Turkish membership negotiations on hold indefinitely, which has led to Turkey threatening to "open the flood gates," in regards to refugees which could serve to completely over burden the European Union.²⁶

With this threat, it is crucial that the European Union slows the influx of refugees, and Turkey is a major origin for secondary movement into the EU, however given the leverage that Turkey will hold over the European Union in these negotiations, a smarter strategy would be to retool the Mediterranean Agenda, and strengthen the EU Mediterranean Partnerships. Through strengthening the partnerships in the Mediterranean, the European Union can increase trade benefits for itself as well as further its objectives

²⁴ Al-Kahlidi Suleiman." EU relaxes trade rules with Jordan to create jobs for Syrian refugees" July 21, 2016. *Reuters*.

²⁵ "EUR: Merkel in Turkey to Bolster Migrant Deal." *AAP General News Wire*, Apr 24, 2016.

<http://access.library.miami.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783705708?accountid=14585>.

²⁶ Karadeniz, T & Tattersall, N. "Erdogan warns Europe that Turkey could open migrant gates." 25 November 2016. *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-europe-erdogan-idUSKBN13K0R6>

and the Mediterranean's objectives of strengthening refugee institutions and capacities, and slowing secondary movement into the European Union, through improvements in these states. The Mediterranean would also experience benefits, as discussed they will house more refugees, however the region will experience increased potential gains from trade and subsequent economic growth, allowing opportunities to improve the respective levels of welfare in the states of partnership²⁷.

In addition to the immediate benefits of strengthening such a partnership, it also mitigates leverage in any further negotiations with Turkey. By mitigating secondary movement in North Africa and the Mediterranean, it would help alleviate the problems the negotiations with Turkey would aim to solve. Many of the refugees move from the Mediterranean to Turkey before attempting entry into the European Union²⁸. By focusing trade efforts on rewarding states that alleviate and improve refugee conditions, it will in fact create a race to the top in regards to refugee reception and capabilities, exponentially relieving the flow of migrants into Europe as pull factors into the European Union would experience a relative decline. This is a more plausible solution for the EU as it limits the flow of migrants a major sticking point for the anti-immigrant parties throughout the EU, and with such partnerships already in place it would be easier for the EU to strengthen and build upon the Mediterranean Agenda, especially given the mutual incentives for both sides to find a solution for mitigating and solving the problems that this refugee crises has given rise to.

Conclusion

The refugee and migration crises has served as one of the most hotly debated topics in the European Union and its impact will serve to shape and have a considerable impact on the future of the European Union. The European Union has an opportunity to strengthen its partnerships in the southern Mediterranean and North Africa, and such a partnership could serve beneficial to both regions in regards to the refugee crises as discussed. Furthermore, such a strategy which is reliant on liberalizing trade through there Mediterranean partners would help mitigate the impact of any threats from Turkey in regards to their separate negotiations regarding Turkish-EU membership who's outcome could serve to have the largest impact on the future of the EU and the international order as a whole. While utilizing a strategy that is trade centric will serve to have a substantial impact, the EU must also make strides in regards to reforming their own Asylum scheme, which has hampered and compounded the problems regarding the influx of refugees as of late.

²⁷.De Wulf, Luc et al. "Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region." September 2009. *Center for Social and Economic Research*

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145214.pdf

²⁸"UN Summit to Hear New Research on Why Refugees, Migrants Crossed Mediterranean in 2015." 19, Sep 2016. *Targeted News Service*.

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