



Robert Schuman

*Contributions of NATO, EU and OSCE to European Security:
Threats and Risks*

– Roberto Domínguez Rivera



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***Contributions of NATO, EU and OSCE to European Security:
Threats and Risks***

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Contributions of NATO, EU and OSCE to European Security: Threats and Risks^ψ

*When I look at Afghanistan,
I see NATO playing the principal
role in security assistance, and
the EU playing a major role
in financial assistance.¹*

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Introduction

As the logic of democracy and free markets spreads throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the concept of security consequently evolved to encompass new challenges derived from the end of the Cold War. Ever since, the debate about security has focused on the subject and the referential object. The former entails an inquiry into whether individuals, groups, states, regions or the global community are the most relevant actors to be protected. The latter reflects on what issues should be considered as part of security, namely, environmental, military or economic, among others. This pluralistic trend set out the premises for the reformation of international security studies² and, to some extent, for the “over-securitization” and “terrorist-ization” of the international agenda as a result of 9/11.

The debate on security has opened up various avenues of analysis. In order to delimit them, two criteria are taken into consideration. First, agents seek “freedom from threats to core values,”³ which is one of the most basic definitions of security; as a result, each agent faces a different type of insecurity. For instance, security at the domestic level “is provided through a

^ψ A previous version of this paper was presented at 46th International Studies Association Convention, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, Hawaii. I thank the comments and suggestions made by Bruce Bagley, Alejandro Chanona, Aimee Kanner and Nuray Ibryamova.

¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Speech to the Cambridge Union Society*, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2, 2005.

² Khatchik Derghoukassian, *After Renaissance: The Reformation of International Security Studies in the Post Cold War*, paper presented at the 42nd International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans, May, 2002.

³ John Baylis, “International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 254.

mixture of legal mechanisms and insurance policies. No such mechanisms exists when it comes to external threats to the state.”⁴ Thus, the present paper focuses on the contributions of European (transatlantic) institutions (European Union, NATO and OSCE) to regional security. Second, it argues that the themes included in the security agenda are determined not only by official discourses, but also by the institutional strategies and policies aimed at deterring countering threats.

Security, threats and risks

Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international security has been associated with states. Intrinsically linked to them, war was a sanctioned phenomenon that developed rules and norms to ensure combatants’ behavior remained within certain limits. At the end of the Cold War, the European context was interpreted as favorably disposed to a new world order based upon an expanded community of democratic states. However, such high expectancies were soon followed by less optimistic predictions that the world was heading for a clash of civilizations. At the beginning of the XXI Century, the uncertainties of the new face of international terrorism boosted the view in the United States that, on behalf of its national security, “U.S. power should not be constrained by legal agreements, arms control treaties, or any détente-type relationship.”⁵

The abrupt changes in the European context in a 15-year period have brought about distinct interpretations with regard to what security is. As a result of such steady transformations (end of Cold War, Yugoslavian Wars, September 11th and March 11th), the Copenhagen School of security studies have captured the gist of the current debate by proposing the theory of “de/securitization.” Particularly relevant in this theory is the relative flexibility of adapting the concept of security depending on the relationship between the securitizing actor and the referent object.⁶ This interaction is not exclusively deduced from some power calculations, nor as an

⁴ Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, eds., *European Security After 9/11* (New York: Ashgate, 2004), 12.

⁵ Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, 16.

⁶ Ole Wæver states: “This is the core of the theory of securitization. Internationally (and increasingly in other contexts), the meaning of security is what it does: someone (a securitizing actor) points to a development or potentiality claiming that something or somebody (the referent object) with an inherent right to survive is existentially threatened, and therefore extraordinary measures (most likely to be wielded by the securitizing actor himself) are justified.” Ole Wæver, “Peace and Security. Two Concepts and their Relationship,” in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, eds. Stephano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (New York: Routledge, 2004), 56.

arbitrary subjective phenomenon, but it is confined by shared understanding, political action and legitimatization, namely, intersubjectivity.⁷

If Europe as a region has undergone dramatic transformations during the past 15 years, what is the legitimate shared understanding of security from the perspective of European institutions? In other words, how have European institutions transformed their policies and objectives in order to face the changing nature of the sources of insecurity? In order to elicit a response, two categories are proposed: insecurity as a threat and insecurity as a risk.

The perception of threat has been central to most definitions of security. Even from the perspective of (de)securitization theory, threat plays a key role. In the words of one of its main proponents, securitization is “the intersubjective establishment of an existential *threat* with saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”⁸ In this regard, traditionally the concept of threat has been commonly employed to describe a situation in which three elements come together. “First, the threat must emanate from an identifiable actor; second, this actor must have or be perceived to have an aggressive intention; and finally, this actor must have the ability to carry out its intentions.”⁹ In other words, where a state’s leaders regard it as facing a probability that another state will either launch an attack or seek to threaten military force for political reasons, it faces a threat. This traditional definition of threat practically prevailed during the Cold War period.

⁷ In this regard, Guzzini states: “...processes of ‘de/securitization.’... (do) not understand security as an objective phenomenon which could be deduced from some power calculations, nor as an arbitrary subjective phenomenon. By concentrating not on what exactly security means and is, but rather on what invoking security does, it argues that whatever security (or national interest) is invoked, i.e. when issues are securitized, particular issues are taken out of regular politics and made part of a special agenda with special decision-making procedures and justifications attached to it. National security mobilizes intersubjectively shared dispositions of understanding, political action and legitimatization. In reverse, and this shows the initial puzzle which prompted the conceptualization, if issues are taken out of national security, if they are de-securitized, then politics can return to its place.” Stefano Guzzini, *The Cold War is what we make of it*,” in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, 48.

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 25.

⁹ Carsten Tams, “The Functions of a European Security and Defense Identity and Its Institutional Form,” in *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space*, eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste Wallander, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 82.

When no such threat exists, either because states do not have the intention or the capability to harm the security of others, states may nevertheless face a security risk.¹⁰ In that perspective, NATO's "enlargement and transformation have been driven primarily by political imperatives—that is, not by a sense of direct threat, but by an environment-shaping agenda of democratization and integration."¹¹ This is why it is important to revisit the concept of risk, which has been melting away as a result of the generalized use of threat in the language of security after 9/11. In fact, "society's reflections on itself are increasingly in terms of risk (risk society). More and more dangers are the product of our own actions, and fewer and fewer attributable to forces completely external to us."¹²

Thus, in order to avoid the abuse and manipulations of current threats in Europe, it is worth saying that not all challenges to security can be understood as threats since not all of them affect the "survival of identity, basic structures or vital functions."¹³ As mentioned above, a risk society has emerged since the early 1990s, whereas some threats of the Cold War mentality persist (weapons of mass destruction) and some other threats, which are diffuse in their manifestations (terrorism), have taken new forms. This is the case of the "war on terror" as a new type of war, which is an ongoing war against a largely invisible enemy, an enemy that does not recognize the norms and customs associated with the modern conception of war, traditionally associated with states.¹⁴

In light of the transformation of the challenges to security, regional institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE) cope with *security threats*, creating rules, norms and procedures to enable their members to identify threats and manage (and where possible to retaliate against) them. Likewise, in the case of risks, institutions also have created mechanisms to cope with *security risks* in order

¹⁰ Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space*, 25.

¹¹ Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-20015. Determinants and Implications for Defense and Planning Shaping* (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), xiii.

¹² Ole Wæver, "Peace and Security. Two Concepts and their Relationship," in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen*, 63.

¹³ Morten Kelstrup, "Gloablization and Societal Insecurity," *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, Stephano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 108. With regard to security after September 11 in the Americas, see Alejandro Chanona, *The New Security Agenda for the Americas: Challenges in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq*, paper prepared for the presentation at the 45th International Studies Association Convention, March 17, 2004, Montreal, Canada.

¹⁴ Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, 13.

“to enable the members to provide and obtain information and to manage disputes in order to avoid generating security dilemmas.”¹⁵

Risks may become threats if they are not prevented timely. Whereas in the case of threats, the likelihood of being affected is immediate, risks emerge from actors that do not intentionally intend to harm other entities. Nonetheless, risks still may undermine security in a region. Myriam A. Dunn has explained this argument as follows:

What all this points to is that the traditional Cold War understanding of threat as something imminent, direct, and certain no longer captures the nature of threats today. To remedy this, some researchers have proposed to pre-empt the word risk for the threats of the modern world, because it seems to capture the unsubstantiated characteristics of modern threats better.... According to the tenets of risk sociology, risks are indirect, unintended, uncertain, and are by definition situated in the future...¹⁶

In this regard, in order to substantiate the concept of security in Europe, this paper makes the following assumptions, which are organized in the table below. First, insecurity is created by agents, which are clearly identifiable in some cases (states), whereas in others they are diffuse (terrorism). Second, the actions of agents may or may not affect other entities; agents will threaten others' security when they intentionally inflict damage, whereas they will risk others' security when they unintentionally and indirectly affect a third party. The use of instruments is vital in the explanation of the sources of insecurity. For instance, an ethnic group has the option of either searching peaceful coexistence with other groups or practicing ethnic cleansing. Either decision will have a different effect for domestic and external entities, which is the fourth premise: the effects on the security of Europe. In this case, there are several definitions of Europe, however, since this essay is mostly concerned with the performance of regional institutions, Europe is understood as the “Europe of regional institutions,” specifically through the membership to NATO and/or EU. Certainly, the contribution of the OSCE to the European security is significant; however, this 55 member organization comprises countries in Central Asia, which are not considered within the “European family.” Finally, threats and risks demand

¹⁵ Keohane, 26

¹⁶ Myriam A. Dunn, *What the Epistemic Communities Approach Can Contribute to the Study of Threat Politics*, paper prepared for the presentation at the 46th International Studies Association Convention, March 1-5, 2005, Honolulu, 4.

responses from regional organizations. Such responses will vary depending upon the policies of the regional organizations.

Sources of insecurity in Europe

Agent	Type of insecurity	Instruments	Impacts on Europe	Regional institutions/w policies
Terrorist groups	Threat	Weapons of mass destruction; conventional weapons	Massive casualties	NATO-EU-OSCE
Organized Crime	Threat	Financial resources Selective intimidation	Corruption Social dislocation Drug and human trafficking	EU
Ethnic and religious intolerant groups	Risk/Threat	Racism Ethnic cleansing of rival groups	Waves of migration Spillover of instability	OSCE-EU-NATO
Migrants	Risk		Informal economy Identities	EU-OSCE
Failed states	Risk	Political persecution, human rights violation		OSCE-EU
Natural Disasters	Risk			EU

Responses from Regional Institutions

One of the most important lessons of World War II was that European states need regional institutions to preserve stability on the old continent. Thus, institutions represent “persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain states, and shape expectations.”¹⁷ Europe has developed different types of institutions during the past five decades, forging international regimes, which “are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables

¹⁷ Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in *International Theory. Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 290.

standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other.”¹⁸ In this regard, NATO, the EU and the OSCE converge in the area of security.

The strength and weaknesses of regional institutions is a result of a consensus among the member states. Nonetheless, particularly in the case of the EU as an integration process, the mere existence of an institution will also influence the perceptions of the members. In the cases of the deepening of the EU and the military transformations of NATO, member states have agreed to adjust their domestic practices to the parameters set by themselves at the regional level. As far as the enlargement of both institutions is concerned, the transformational effects of the EU and NATO on candidate states is even more dramatic since they have to radically adopt and internalize new norms and practices in a short period of time. In this vein, based on Krasner, the role of institutions in the realm of European security entails four feedback mechanisms: “First, regimes may alter actors’ calculations of how maximize their interest. Second, regimes may alter interests themselves. Third, regimes may become a source of power to which international actors can appeal. Fourth, regimes may alter the power capabilities of different actors, including states.”¹⁹ Taking into consideration these assumptions, what is the contribution of each one of these regional organizations to European security?

NATO

NATO has undergone several transformations, particularly since the early 1990s. NATO’s traditional military job during the Cold War shifted from territorial defense towards peacemaking and, in the case of the Kosovo air campaign, some robust peacemaking. Certainly, the Soviet Pact constituted a threat with its latent aggressive intentions supported by a massive nuclear and conventional military machine. As today’s threats come from “a combination of failed states, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,”²⁰ NATO has played a key role in preserving security in Europe, mainly through its enlargement process and the subsequent military transformation of the new members.

¹⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

¹⁹ Krasner, 361.

²⁰ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Speech to the Cambridge Union Society*, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2, 2005.

As mentioned above, institutions shape preferences and NATO has done so during the enlargement process. NATO's rationale is reflected in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, which links 26 states to NATO, and the enlargements of 1999 and 2004, both designed to expand NATO's leverage in shaping the political and economic development of European countries where democracy and free markets were not yet taken for granted. In order to win NATO memberships in 1999 and 2004, the candidate countries agreed to long agendas of reforms, ranging from ensuring free press and fair elections to protecting minorities and acting against drug trafficking and corruption. Likewise, when the PfP was launched on January 10, 1994, NATO demanded from candidate states the establishment of civil control over their armies, profound reforms of their soviet-era forces, and efforts to develop NATO-compatible militaries. For instance, in the prelude to the admission of new members, the policy of carrot and sticks was widely used. In 2002, the Bush administration warned Slovakia that it would not be admitted if it had allowed a nationalist former prime minister to return to office.²¹

In addition to the military transformations in Eastern and Central Europe, there is an overhaul in the deployment of the United States forces in Europe, which would reduce the American military presence in Germany (78,000 troops) in favor of smaller, less costly bases in Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria), which also are closer to the post-Cold War conflicts of today.²²

Some of NATO's contributions to European security were the deployment of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the United States after September 11th, in Turkey during early 2003²³ as well as at the Euro 2004 football championship in Portugal and at the 2004 Athens Olympics.

Derived from the different nature of threats and risks, NATO has been engaging in out of area operations and activities in order to prevent the spread of such challenges into the member's

²¹ *International Herald Tribune*, "NATO's welcome expansion," April 8, 2002.

²² Mark Lander, "NATO Chief Sees Shift of U.S. Forces in Europe," *New York Times*, March 2003.

²³ "In response to the April 16, 2003 decision by NATO to end Operation Display Deterrence, General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, today gave the order for the gradual reduction of NATO AWACS crews, the Patriot Fire Unit, and other support personnel deployed to Turkey... The Operation began on February 26, 2003... Jones thanks the personnel to support our ally against the potential threat from Iraq." U.S. Department of State, *Forces were Deployed in February to Counter Potential Threat Form Iraq*, Statement 910, April 22, 2003.

territory. The General Secretary of NATO has said that “at NATO, we have agreed that we must tackle these threats when and where they arise, otherwise they will end up on our doorstep, and it will be too late to deal with them effectively.”²⁴ This is the underlying reason that motivates NATO to deploy naval forces in the Mediterranean to monitor shipping and provide deterrent to terrorism at sea (Operation Active Endeavor).

The intergovernmental character of NATO makes it dependent on the ability of member states to reach consensus. Two recent events reflect how such agreements or the lack thereof can make possible NATO “out of area operations.” First, in the aftermath of September 11, NATO agreed to carry out its first mission beyond Europe’s frontiers in its 54-year history, when it took formal control of Afghanistan’s multinational peacekeeping force on August 11, 2003.²⁵ Thus, under UN mandate, NATO assists the Afghan government on security matters. However, it has been said that by “excluding NATO from America’s fledgling war on terrorism does hold some advantages from the U.S. perspective. No longer does Washington need to seek the approval of all 25 allies for each and every step of the military campaign, as was the case in Kosovo.”²⁶

The second event can be observed in the individual participation of NATO members in the invasion and peace building in Iraq. Institutionally, NATO has a very modest participation in Iraq. Thus, on September 22, 2004, NATO ambassadors agreed to create a military training academy in Iraq, raising the number of trainers from 40 to approximately 300. The initial decision to offer training was agreed to by the 26-nation alliance in June, 2004, and the NATO Training Assistance Implementation Mission was created in Iraq on July 30. However, as individual countries, other members have opted for a different approach. Spain, which pulled out

²⁴ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Speech to the Cambridge Union Society*, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2, 2005

²⁵ Amy Waldman, “NATO Takes Control of Peace Force in Kabul,” *New York Times*, August 12, 2003. Until then, NATO had “already provided more than 90 percent of the troops for a 5,000-member International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan. But its decision to assume command of force is meant to lend continuity and stability to an operation that until now has been led by a new country every six months. Until then, the international community has had to search every six months for new nations to lead the mission. The search is over.” See also Todd Pitman, “NATO to Command Peace Force in Kabul,” *Washington Post*, August 10, 2003. He states: “The force has been led by Britain and Turkey –and for the last six months jointly by Germany and the Netherlands—since it was created in December 2001 to bolster security in Kabul following the US-led war that toppled the Taliban government. The force’s mandate expires in June (2004), when nationwide elections are to be held to choose a new head of state.”

²⁶ Tomas Valasek, “The Fighting Against Terrorism: Where’s NATO?” *World Policy Journal* (Winter 2001-02): 19.

of Iraq in 2004, offered to train Iraqi soldiers near Madrid. Romania, with a pragmatic strategy of getting benefits from the reallocation of US troops in Europe, would train officers inside Iraq. France offered 20 million euros to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police officers in Qatar or in France, whereas Belgium is also considering helping with training outside Iraq. Germany promised to train army officers in the United Arab Emirates.²⁷ Training of instructors will start in April 2005 and courses begin in September.

With regard to other transformations within NATO, two are particularly relevant. First, the NATO Response Force is a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components and will be able to start deploying after five days' notice and sustain itself during operations lasting 30 days or longer. The NRF prototype numbering 9,500 was officially inaugurated on October 15, 2003, at the headquarters of the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands. The NRF achieved an initial operational capability in October 2004, with some 17,000 troops, and will grow to 24,000 when it reaches its full operational capability by October 2006.²⁸ The second transformation is the creation of NATO's multinational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion, which is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction and the release of any CBRN inside and beyond NATO's area of responsibility.²⁹

EU

Security is embedded in the integration process. The Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s was *per se* an institutional consensus to make war unfeasible. Whereas the complex architecture of Europe expanded its scope of polices and countries and the end of the Cold War brought new challenges, the need for concrete security policies became more evident. Due to the uncertainty of the 1990s, the accession of the 10 new members in 2004 was strongly guided by the perception of promotion of stability through the free market and democracy.

²⁷ Eric Schmitt and Judy Dempsey, "U.S. and NATO to bolster training for Iraqis," *International Herald Tribune*, February 11, 2005.

²⁸ NATO, *NATO Briefing*, Brussels, December 2004, 9.

²⁹ NATO, *NATO Briefing*, Brussels, December 2004), 3.

The peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 eliminated threats of massive-scale violence for the EU. Instead, it brought risks resulting from the uncertainties of the transformations in the region. Thus, the strategy taken by the Community/Union to address the internal sources of conflict reflect liberal ideas: Democracy, respect for human and minority rights, economic growth and integration would lead to stability and peace. Karen Smith states that “The EU is applying its own experiences with regards to Eastern Europe.... (In order to do so) the Community adopted two main approaches: it sets conditions for closer relations and eventual membership and it extended aid and technical assistance.”³⁰ In the case of external threats, the EU created the Pact on Stability in Europe and initiated a more active role in peacekeeping and peace-building.

Even though security concerns are hardly mentioned in the admission criteria, those play a prominent role in the enlargement process.³¹ Thus, enlargement was presented as the mechanism intended to deal with the problems of peace and stability and the strategy chosen was designed on a liberal basis; however, the failures of the international community, particularly Europe, to face the burst of violence in the former Yugoslavia made evident the weakness of the integration process as a promise of stability.

The EU has been criticized for the lack of willingness to face hard security challenges. With pending reforms and developments on the EU agenda, from the St. Malo initiative onwards, the Council of the EU, following the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council (June 1999), the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) specifically decided to create a non-military management mechanism to coordinate and put to more effective use the various civilian means and resources in parallel with military resources. Since then, three bodies have been put in place. The first is the Political and Security Committee (PSC); PSC is responsible for political monitoring and strategic management of crisis management operations. The second is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which was created by decision of May 22, 2000, and is responsible for providing information, making

³⁰ Karen E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Eastern Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 138.

³¹ Nuray V. Ibryamova, *Security, Borders, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union*, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 4, no. 15, University of Miami, May 2004.

recommendations and giving its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. The third is the Police Unit. It was created by the Nice European Council (December 2000) and is attached to the Council Secretariat.

The Nice European Council also approved the creation of three new permanent political and military bodies.³² In addition to its civilian functions, the PSC sends guidelines to the Military Committee and receives its opinions and recommendations. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the second military body. It is the highest military body established within the Council. Finally, the European Union Military Staff provides military expertise and support to the ESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis operations.

In the same military area, under the Joint Council action in July 2001, the EU also decided to transfer two agencies from the WEU to EU structures, namely the Satellite Centre and the Institute of Security Studies, in order to support the Union in the context of CFSP and in particular the ESDP.

In the post-September 11th context, the document *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (European Security Strategy) was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The ESS does not take the Cold War and its aftermath as its point of departure—indeed, it is hardly mentioned. Instead, the key reference is European integration which, it is claimed, “has transformed relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens.”³³

In contrast to previous security doctrines based almost exclusively on the military dimension, according to Helmut Kuhne, the ESS takes a holistic approach as reflected in the following phrase: “security is a precondition of development.” In thus identifying the key threats to global security (terrorism, WMD, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime), the ESS seeks to elucidate a wider concept of security drawing upon the role played by factors, which heretofore had not been considered as being of primary relevance to security policy. Also,

³² Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Bodies” (Institute for Security Studies. <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/08-bodies.pdf>, accessed September 24, 2004).

³³ Simon Duke, “The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World,” *European Affairs Review* 9 (2004): 463.

in acknowledging the destructive forces of poverty, malnutrition and disease and their deleterious effects on the stability of states and their societies, the ESS argues that only a mix of military capacities with civilian capabilities and know-how can be the basis for contributing to a more secure world.³⁴

In the medium and long term, the creation of the European Defense Agency is of the utmost relevance. Sparked by tensions over the Iraq war, which threatened to destabilize the CFSP, the European Defense Agency was created in November 2003, and funded in June 2004, several years earlier than originally planned.³⁵

Whereas the EU has finally created specific agents in the EU military sector in order to initiate a process of military convergence, some moderate steps have been taken with regard to military operations. One of the initial assessments states that, “the missions remain very limited in scope and depend heavily on the leadership and commitment of the major member states; are not complex operationally; the financing is limited and they have involved the participation of third states.”³⁶ Certainly, the first operations are quite modest, but they constitute concrete actions which would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in January 2003 and represents the EU’s first ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. The EU took over from the UN-led police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, whose mandate was to monitor, mentor and inspect the local police force. The EUPM has a mandate for 3 years (until December 2005), with an annual budget of €38 million, of which €20 million are financed by the Community.³⁷ Four hundred forty two EU police officers participate in this mission.

Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003 and was the first-ever military operation, in which the EU-NATO collaboration proved to work well. This operation took place

³⁴ European Parliament, *Working Document on European Security Strategy*. Committee on Foreign Affairs (Helmut Kuhne, Rapporteur), November 24, 2004, 2.

³⁵ Heather Timmons, “Fledgling European Defense Agency faces a tough battle,” *International Herald Tribune*, Thursday, July 22, 2004.

³⁶ Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations”, (Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>, accessed October 5, 2004): 2.

³⁷ Lynch and Missiroli.

in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), in which the EU used NATO assets and capabilities and where the EU Operation Commander was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In the context of the EU-NATO relations, it is important also to add the CME-CMX03, which was a joint EU-NATO crisis managements exercise (19-25 November 2003). Such exercises provide further experience assisting the consolidation of EU-NATO relations in crisis management.

The Concordia operation, requested by the FYROM and backed by United Nations Security Council resolution 1371, was expected to last six months. Its initial budget was €6.2 million, and 13 EU member states (all except Ireland and Denmark) and 14 non-member states contributed forces to the mission, totaling 350 armed personnel (308 from the EU). EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia succeeded Concordia in December 2003. The total cost of the mission amounts to €15 million for the first year.

Another important operation was Artemis. This was an operation carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which NATO was regularly and timely informed of the EU's intentions, in full respect of the spirit and the letter of the Crisis Consultation Arrangements (12 June-1 September 2003). In accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003), this operation sought to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital.

As part of the continuing coordination with NATO, at the end of 2004 the EU took over the NATO-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its purpose is to create a viable, peaceful and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina with a long-term prospect of EU membership. In practice, this means that the EU and NATO have to work very closely together. The European Union is not running the mission by itself but instead has access to NATO's assets and planning, which are being conducted by the deputy head of the military division of NATO. This gives the U.S. an overview of the operation, of which it was initially highly suspicious due to the possible intentions of some EU member states to run an independent mission in Bosnia once the EU took it over from NATO.³⁸

³⁸ Judy Dempsey, "EU Given Green Light for Bosnia Mission," *Financial Times*, April 27, 2004, 8.

OSCE

Originally conceived as a mechanism for fostering dialogue between East and West in the Cold War period, the OSCE reinvented itself to participate in the architecture of Europe by mostly monitoring political risks in a wide area that encompasses 55 countries. Although ignored in several debates on security, the comprehensive approach of the OSCE “seeks to deal with an unusually wide range of security-related issues, including preventive diplomacy, political-military confidence and security building measures, arms control, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and steps to strengthen both economic and environmental security.”³⁹ In line with its documents, the tasks of the OSCE are threefold (known as the Helsinki baskets): security issues, economic, scientific, technology, and environmental issues; and human-dimension issues.⁴⁰

Unlike security military regional organizations such as NATO, the OSCE monitoring activities have developed the function of warning members about growing political risks as well as providing systematized information to exert pressure when members fail to live up the OSCE commitments. Despite the fact that the OSCE is a ‘soft’ security organization, its reports on elections and human rights, *inter alia*, contribute to the legitimization of the performance of its members in these areas. In fact, although OSCE peacekeeping capacities are limited, “the OSCE Chairman-in-office (rotating annual basis) may appeal to organizations like NATO or the EU (UN) to enforce sanctions on OSCE member states that deliberately and repeatedly violate OSCE norms and agreements.”⁴¹

Currently, the OSCE’s 18 field missions are working to advance security, human rights and conflict resolution from the Balkans to Central Asia, the largest one being in Kosovo. The geography of the displayed missions reflects the fact that numerous former centralized economies and CIS countries are struggling to improve their democratic political performances -

³⁹ Craig G. Dunkerley, “Considering Security amidst Strategic Change: The OSCE Experience,” *Middle East Policy* XI, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 131.

⁴⁰ Nina Græger and Alexandra Novosseloff, “The Roles of the OSCE and the EU,” *The United Nations and Regional Security. Europe and Beyond*, eds. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 81.

⁴¹ Græger and Novosseloff, 82.

a situation which brings about discord particularly with Russia. In January 2005, as a result of the active role of the OSCE in Ukraine and strong criticism from Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, the OSCE's chairman-in-office stated: "I will not hide from you that there is a sense of crisis in the OSCE. The recent statements of dissatisfaction from the Russian Federation and some CIS countries must be taken seriously."⁴² In response, then Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that there are no double standards when it comes to OSCE election monitoring in CIS countries and recalled that Russia's commitments to withdraw military forces from Moldova and to agree with Georgia on the duration of the Russian military presence there "remain unfulfilled."⁴³

The disagreement between OSCE, on the one hand, and Russia and other CIS members, on the other, is basically due to the lack of progress in the area of political rights. During 2004, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) supported or was involved in 15 elections in Europe, North America (the 2004 electoral process in United States) and Central Asia. The most problematic reports were precisely in Central Asia. In some cases, such as Tajikistan (February 27, 2005), the OSCE severely criticized the entire electoral process, from legislative framework to actual vote tabulation. In other cases, such as Kazakhstan, the OSCE/ODIHR issued a report on the electoral process in 2004; as a result, the United States urged Kazakhstan to amend its electoral law to address the shortcomings of the 2004 parliamentary elections.⁴⁴ In the case of the electoral process in Uzbekistan in December 2004, the OSCE/ODIHR report considered that the elections fell significantly short of OSCE requirements. Moldova was not the exception and has been one of the extreme cases in which there is a strong claim demand from the United States, the EU and the OSCE for the government to reverse trends of "harassment of opposition leaders, biased coverage of public media, intimidation of civil society groups, and use of public resources for campaign purposes."⁴⁵

⁴² Dimitrij Rupel, *Statement at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, January 26, 2005.

⁴³ Colin Powell, *Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE*, Sofia, Bulgaria, December 7, 2004.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Ambassador Stephen Minikes Addresses OSCE Permanent Council*, Statement 600, January 21, 2005.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S., EU, OSCE Urge Free, Fair Moldovan Election*, Statement 1220, February 17, 2005.

The electoral process in Ukraine at the end of 2004 was of particular relevance for the OSCE. In addressing the difficult political situation in the country following the disputed second round of the presidential election on 21 November, 2004, the OSCE's electoral observer mission was its largest ever deployed by this organization. The repeat second round on 26 December showed a marked improvement in the electoral process, including fairer campaign conditions, a more transparent electoral administration, and more balanced media coverage. As a result of the role of the OSCE, "the cautious congratulations by the EU,⁴⁶ Poland and Lithuania "were issued after the monitoring mission of the OSCE concluded that the elections were fairer than previous polls."⁴⁷

Intrinsically related to democracy, respect for minorities is one of the key issues in the OSCE's agenda. In addition to several institutional bodies created in the 1990s, under the Bulgarian OSCE Chairman in office (second half of 2004), and as a result of conferences held in Berlin, Paris and Brussels in 2004, the OSCE created special representatives to address anti-Semitism (Combating Anti-Semitism), racism and discrimination (Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination), and anti-Muslim sentiments (Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims).

On the other hand, the OSCE has recently been working in the field of counter terrorism, particularly serving as a negotiation arena. Indeed, Terrence Hopmann states that

⁴⁶ "The EU has learned the preliminary critical findings and conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission. The second round of elections had already fallen short of international standards. In view of the irregularities detailed in the OSCE/ODIHR report the EU seriously questioned whether the official results would fully reflect the will of the Ukraine electorate. The EU Presidency would be in touch without delay with the OSCE Chairmanship-in-office to discuss further steps. The EU urgently called on the Ukrainian authorities to review together with OSCE/ODIHR the electoral process results. All EU member states would call in the Ukrainian ambassador to convey this message to their authorities." Council of the European Union, *2622nd Council Meeting on General Affairs and External Relations*, Brussels, November 22-23, 2004, 15.

⁴⁷ Judy Dempsey, "Europeans Praise 'free and fair' Ukraine Election," *International Herald Tribune*, December 28, 2004.

... the OSCE has identified its special niche in the struggle against terrorism primarily in doing what it had been doing all along—namely strengthening security through human dimension activities... In particular, the OSCE since 9-11 has increasingly emphasized the long-term conflict prevention activities associated with good governance and social integration as opposed to more immediate conflict prevention... Similarly, its focus has turned to these regions in Euroasia where democratic institutions area least visible.⁴⁸

In this regard, the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council in 2003 produced a number of action-oriented strategies against terrorism and considered “preventing and combating terrorism a top priority for all of us.” With a pragmatic approach, the OSCE seems to be focused on negotiating and collaborating, particularly with the EU, on concrete areas such as airport security, policing, and secure travel documents.⁴⁹ Likewise, the OSCE held the first intergovernmental conference on Man-Portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, which are being sold on the black market in and around OSCE countries.⁵⁰ As a result of the interest in the area of combating terrorism, the OSCE’s unified budget grew from €165.5 in 2003 to €180 in 2004 (it is worth mentioning that the budget was €12 in 1993).⁵¹

From the above-mentioned, it can be said that the OSCE’s broad conceptualization of security represents a clear example of the ability of institutions to shape state behavior. Although it is not always successful in carrying out its objectives, however, it advances state acceptance of the norms of democracy, human rights and cooperation on security-related issues.⁵²

⁴⁸ P. Terrence Hopmann, “The OSCE Response to 9/11,” Paper prepared for 2005 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Hawaii, March 1-5, 2005.

⁴⁹ Salomon Passy, 6.

⁵⁰ Salomon Passy, *Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 108th Congress, February 26, 2004, 7.

⁵¹ OSCE, Unified Budget in Million Euro (1993-2004),) (<http://www.osce.org/>, accessed February, 24, 2005)

⁵² Mary M. McKenzie and Peter H. Loedel, eds. *The Promise and reality of European Security Cooperation. States, Interest, and Institutions* (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 182.

Final Considerations

NATO, the EU and the OSCE have undergone numerous transformations in order to manage current threats and risks to European security. NATO has been able to have a modest but important participation in military operations (mainly peacekeeping) from former Yugoslavia to Afghanistan; simultaneously, both enlargements in 1999 and 2004 transformed the militaries of Eastern Europe according to NATO's parameters in order to create military interoperability among its member states. The EU, on the other hand, has carried out a new enlargement in 2004 under the liberal assumption of providing security by political and economic reforms in the new members; at the same time, it has begun a process of active military participation in peacekeeping operations, which is a good sign for the credibility of the EU as a security provider. The OSCE has also made a significant contribution through monitoring basic freedoms, warning about political crises, and enhancing cooperation to strengthen stability.

At first sight, the three institutions analyzed have clear-cut functions in the making of European security: NATO-military; EU-political-economic, and OSCE-political. However, in light of their institutional performances, it is clear that there is an overlap in their security activities, demanding transformations from all of them. After several years of political disagreements, the Berlin plus mechanism seems to pave the way for more efficient cooperation between NATO and the EU in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, the OSCE has also started some activities in order to contribute to the fight against terrorism and border security, which have to take place in close coordination with the EU and NATO.

It is expected that the debates about the reforms of the three institutions will strengthen the cooperation among them. With regard to the EU, the Constitutional Treaty points in the right direction, particularly with respect to the military area. On the other hand, although NATO seems to remain under the current dynamic, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder stated in February 2005 that NATO "has ceased to be the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate the most important strategic issues of the day,"⁵³ and propose the

⁵³ Daniel Dombey and Peter Spiegel, "Germany suggests far-reaching NATO Review," *Financial Times*, February 13, 2005.

establishment of a high level panel to review the relationship, reporting to NATO and the EU leaders by 2006. In the case of the OSCE, there are reforms in the pipeline with the establishment of a panel of Eminent Persons to review the OSCE and its functions, and expecting to receive the panel's recommendations in June (2005) in order to "expand the OSCE's political-military, counter terrorism, and economic activities"⁵⁴

Whereas these processes in the realm of security are taking place, it has to be kept in mind that the prosperity gap between Eastern and Western Europe further compounds the necessity to provide financial as well as organizational support for these countries, as well as incentives for the successful completion of their political and economical transformations.⁵⁵ This may erode any attempt to reverse the current achievements in the field of European security and will lead reluctant countries such as Russia to be less suspicious and more cooperative in combating current threats and challenges for the security. This will avoid repeating one sad lesson of the twentieth century, that refusing to form alliances with defeated adversaries is more dangerous than forming such alliances.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Stephan M. Minikes, *Response to Slovenian Prime Minister, Dimitrij Rupel, OSCE Chairman in Office*, Vienna, Austria, January 13, 2005.

⁵⁵ Ibryamova, 12.

⁵⁶ "In my view, however, keeping Russia out of NATO increases the risk of Russian expansionism, while making it clear that Russia would be eligible for admission to NATO (if it satisfies the criteria mentioned above –democracy, human rights, market based economy, armed forces under civil control, good relations with neighboring states) reduces the risk..." James A. Baker III, "Russia in NATO?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 99-100.