



Salvador de Madariaga Institute

*Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements,
1953-1988: A Spanish Perspective*

-Angel Viñas



Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 3 No. 7
September 2003

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series

The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center.

These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which will conclude in the Spring of 2003. The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention are Europe's role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. During the Convention proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

1. The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to intergovernmental cooperation?
2. How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention?
3. The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe.
4. Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention?
5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.
7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?

Miami European Union Center
University of Miami
1531 Brescia Avenue
Coral Gables, FL 33146-3010
Phone: 305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4875
E-Mail: jroy@miami.edu
Webs: www.miami.edu/international-studies/euc
www.euroy.org; www.miamieuc.org

Jean Monnet Chair Staff:
Joaquín Roy (Director)
Aimee Kanner (Editor)
Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant)
Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant)
Mariela Arenas (Research Assistant)

**Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements, 1953-1988:
A Spanish Perspective**

Angel Viñas*

The Jean Monnet Chair
University of Miami
Miami, Florida
September 2003

* Angel Viñas was formerly an executive advisor to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador of the European Community to the United Nations in New York. In the European Commission, Brussels, he was in charge of EU relations with Latin America and Asia, security policy, multilateral relations, and human rights and democratization assistance. He has held Chairs of Political Economy at several Spanish universities, most recently in Madrid.

NEGOTIATING THE U.S.-SPANISH AGREEMENTS, 1953-1988: A SPANISH PERSPECTIVE

On September 26, 2003, the U.S.-Spanish contractual relationship celebrated its 50th anniversary. It is a good opportunity for reflecting on some of the major features that have characterized its establishment and development. A more detailed treatment is provided in a parallel book by the present author. (1)

Introduction: A Unique Relationship

The contractual relationship between the United States and Spain has generated many flows of ink and is likely to continue doing so as yet closed archives are opened for research. From the Spanish side, the most relevant records are those of the Joint Chiefs (Alto Estado Mayor), the National Defense Council (Junta de Defensa Nacional) and the three service Departments. All of them are under lock and key and remain inaccessible to historians. This is not the case with the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce. U.S. archives fortunately follow more open-minded policies but they do not always provide enough insight into the Spanish decision-making process. It is a safe bet that historians interested in U.S.-Spanish relations have work guaranteed for several years. (2)

Seen from the Spanish point of view, the U.S.-Spanish relationship has been unique, without precedent and fraught with enormous consequences for Spanish foreign and domestic policies. (3) In Spanish contemporary history this has been the longest lasting association with a foreign country. Spain had changed orientations in its foreign policy posture (leaning either toward France or the UK, whose actions usually restrained the Spanish margin for maneuver, or briefly to Germany) but in no case did such orientations lead to a permanent alignment.

The 1953 initial agreements with the U.S. meant above all the rupture of Spanish neutrality in international affairs (with the exception of the temptation to do so on the side of the Third Reich). (4) Not many European countries stuck to their neutrality in the 20th century. Only Sweden and Switzerland did so. However, Spain is a separate case and followed a separate path, an authentic *Sonderweg*. It managed not to become a belligerent in the Second World War, except against the USSR via the “Blue Division”, fighting alongside the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. Since 1953, conveniently forgotten its Fascist whims and inclinations, the Franco dictatorship diligently aligned itself with the Western strategy not through the North Atlantic Treaty, as so many other European countries did, but in virtue of a purely bilateral agreement with the United States. (5)

Such alignment led to a foreign military implantation in Spanish territory, also a first in Spanish history, although this did not imply a mutual defense commitment. Spanish foreign policy was put on a new track in which little by little the Franco dictatorship was able to gather a broad measure of international respectability, particularly in the multilateral area. Generally speaking, with U.S. prodding and support Spain gradually inserted itself in the international cooperation schemes of the post world

war: the UN and its specialized agencies and the OECE. In fact, only NATO and the purely European cooperation and integration schemes turned out to be absolutely impenetrable. The European Community, where the United States had very little to say, was not amenable to Spanish entreaties and Franco never tried his luck with the Council of Europe. On the other hand, the United States was not able to convince all NATO members of the desirability of Franco's participation.

Although such developments strengthen the fundamental importance of the U.S. connection for Spanish foreign policies during the Franco regime, they pale beside its domestic impacts. A clear distinction between both kinds of repercussions is difficult to establish. However, from an analytical point of view the most important domestic consequences for Spain of the bilateral relationship can be identified in five areas:

- The agreements were essential in engineering a pervasive feeling of security in the dictatorship, which had been hotly contested in the immediate post world war period. The U.S. embrace created a new environment in which the Franco regime was able to survive without being exposed to more or less uncomfortable challenges. This feeling of security was supported by a fair amount of U.S. economic and military assistance. Although it never reached the amounts given to other Western European countries, it did enable the dictatorship to allocate resources to the military and the civilian sectors of the economy to an extent that domestic sources alone would have never allowed.
- The agreements became the mainstay of what might be called a "Franco model of deterrence". The Spanish deterrent was directed both externally and domestically. Externally, it was applied to North African security scenarios, although the United States never made any bones about its intention not to become embroiled in Spanish disputes with Morocco. Domestically, it was applied to the "internal enemy" (the "reds", the vanquished in the civil war, the "separatists" and all those who might actively oppose the dictatorship) so as to protect what was called, in the regime's rhetoric, "the unbreakable unity among the people and regions of Spain". It was without a doubt the most important aspect. The domestic deterrent value of the U.S. connection was not lost among U.S. decision-makers. What Spain needed, said President Eisenhower, was "a good little Army" which could keep the country stable.
- The agreements led to the introduction in Spain of modern approaches to economic management, both at macro and micro levels. They also made it possible for Spain to become a member of the Bretton Woods institutions. Such membership became essential for the only strategic operation in the history of what was after all a very cautious dictatorship: the 1959 stabilization and liberalization plan, over the reticence of General Franco himself and the opposition of his faithful lieutenant, the no less troglodytic Admiral Carrero Blanco. Without such a strategic *volte face*, the Spanish "economic miracle" of the sixties would not have occurred and the regime would not have been able to expand the social basis of its political legitimacy.
- The agreements provided respectability. Spain was not visited by any major foreign dignitaries (no European prime minister or head of state ever deigned meeting with Franco, his Portuguese dictatorial colleague Oliveira Salazar

excluded). However, Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon duly went to Madrid as well as, in rather dubious circumstances and with a more dubious *rationale*, President Ford. The waves of optimism that such visits generated were enhanced by the exquisite care applied by the U.S. Government not to interfere in Spanish domestic affairs even to the extent of not giving any kind of moral support to the political opposition when Franco's days were numbered.

- No wonder, therefore, that the U.S. connection gave rise to strong anti-U.S. sentiment among the Spanish Left. These feelings combined with the prevalent attitude among the Right (although for vastly different reasons), in particular the fundamentalists of the Catholic Church, parts of the Army and the powerless but politically unavoidable Falangistas. After Franco died in 1975, the United States was not very popular among Spaniards. (6)

This article is an attempt to identify the most important structural features in the successive rounds of negotiations of the U.S.-Spanish agreements. Six rounds are considered, four during the dictatorship and two during the evolving democratic system. The foundational one took place in 1952-53. It led to the highest pinnacles of privilege ever attained by the U.S. Government vis-à-vis Spain. The second round was held ten years later. During this round, and in spite of General Franco's wishes, all agreements were extended by five years. The third round started in 1968, was rather tough and ended, after one of the most important cabinet changes during the dictatorship, in the mediocre 1970 agreement. The fourth and last round under Franco evolved in 1974-75. In its final stages the greatest event of Spanish contemporary history happened: General Franco died. The negotiations were finished in early 1976 after certain changes were introduced so as to enable both governments to claim a U.S. accolade to the incipient Spanish Monarchy. The first round under the democratic system was conducted by the last UCD (center) Government in 1982. In a way it was a watershed. The last round began in 1986 under the first Socialist Government in Spanish history led by Felipe González and ended in 1988. The resulting agreement placed the old bilateral relationship on a new conceptual and political foundation. Later on, under the second conservative Aznar Government, an update and adjustment were negotiated, in 2001-2002. The format and a great part of what had been agreed in 1988 were kept.

In short, the six rounds of negotiations cover a long period during which immense domestic and international changes took place both in Spain and the United States, and in the international system, particularly in the wake of the geotectonic movements which followed the implosion of the USSR.

The present article is structured as follows. First, some of the major features of the foundational round and its results are examined. It is a subject sufficiently known in the relevant literature since 1981, when the present author published a book in which the wide range of secret and confidential agreements that underlie the 1953 pact was revealed in great detail. Second, the strategic features of the U.S. positions in the successive negotiations are highlighted. This is a relatively easy task since the United States was keen on preventing to the greatest possible extent the erosion of the privileges it had achieved in 1953. Third, the contrary features of the Spanish strategy in the long struggle to shake the *status quo* and to rebalance the erosion of sovereignty consented in the foundational round will be illuminated. Lastly, the approach followed by the Spanish negotiators of the democratic system will be underscored.

The Foundational Round

The dynamics that led to the 1952-53 negotiations are well known. Even before the Second World War ended, the Pentagon addressed the convenience of having air and naval bases in Spain. This military convenience, occasionally exaggerated by some authors, collided with contrary political and ideological imperatives. It was not easy to throw a life vest to a dictatorship that many sectors of Western public opinion, and numerous governments, despised as a relic of the Axis or as a regime in whose baptism the Fascist powers had had their say. The Truman administration soon signaled its willingness to confront the Spanish situation in a way that was not particularly welcome by the United Kingdom and France, bent on an appeasing course. This divergence led to some friction between the Allies. (7)

A new factor arose which opened the door to an in-depth revision of the U.S. attitude toward the Spanish dictatorship. This was the deterioration of the international security environment. It was a change that put the Spanish case in the same framework according to which the United States contemplated the treatment meted out to its former enemies. If both Germany and Italy were being granted generous political and economic assistance, why should a dictatorship that was dangerous to a part of its subjects only but was in control of an area of unquestionable geo-strategic importance be treated differently? Spain might be the last redoubt for defending Western Europe or the springboard from which to carry out the counteroffensive. In any event, Spain was the missing link to close the network of forward-deploying U.S. bases which the Strategic Air Command was keen in establishing to encircle the USSR.

The obvious answer did not take long. Although the State Department and President Truman himself stuck for a while to a rather reserved position, the same could not be posited for a substantial sector in the Congress. Catholic and anti-Communist congressmen, as well as the military, saw in Franco's Spain an interesting pawn in the containment strategy against the Soviet threat. There were picturesque assessments. Representative James J. Murphy (D-New York) referred to the Spanish dictator as "a lovely and lovable character". One could say many things about General Franco but Murphy's choice of adjectives is not necessarily one that even the regime's propagandists would have been tempted to use.

The State Department relented. None less than George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, recommended a more flexible position vis-à-vis the Spanish dictatorship. His advice was countenanced by Secretary Marshall himself. (8) To defend the West from an evil enemy, very distinguished and well-meaning democrats were ready to embrace a lesser evil. The values of freedom and human rights that the United States predicated in the hard struggle against Communism would always be kept in abeyance when tinpot dictators controlled pieces of geography that could be used to defend freedom worldwide. (9) Thus, in early 1948 the United States ceased putting political pressure on the Spanish regime and simply advised about the need for liberalizing the economy. This approach was far less controversial although a decade had to pass before the dictatorship decisively acted upon it.

It was clearly not possible to bring Spain into the mainstream of the beneficiaries of generous U.S. economic assistance. However, world events conspired to soften the international constraints under which the Spanish regime operated. The "loss" of China

and the outbreak of the Korean War encouraged the U.S. Navy and the USAF, the CIA and a distressed sector of the Congress to engineer a turnaround in the U.S. position. The issue became how to incorporate Spain into the containment strategy. NATO membership was unattainable. In this club there were members that, for a variety of reasons, some freely acknowledged, others not so, felt unhappy at seating a despicable regime at the same table. No one was so strict with the Portuguese regime but then Oliveira Salazar never raised such an intense revulsion as Franco did.

In Spain itself politico-diplomatic finesse was in short supply. The strategy adopted was the simplest and the surest. The withdrawal of ambassadors decided by the UNGA in December 1946 had been a symbolic measure. But no one could deny that it had made the dictatorship sweat. In the ensuing xenophobic and hyper-nationalistic spasm, Franco and his acolytes presented the challenges from abroad as an “international siege” of which SPAIN (in capital letters) was the innocent victim. Policies were designed to cement the unity of the Fatherland and its Caudillo and to fuse even more the winners of the civil war, many of them already intimately linked by the “pact of blood” that underpinned domestic repression. As the recent historiography shows, this was coincidental with a relentless ferocity against the “eternal” enemies of the Franco’s peace.

The Spanish Government locked itself in an imaginary blockhouse of its own making. It adopted a waiting strategy, as the Moor patiently waits at the door of his home until he sees the corpse of his enemy pass by. This was the metaphor used to explain the Spanish policy by one of the epitomes of that National-Catholic wave that came to the rescue of the dictatorship: the minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martín Artajo, whose task it was to confront head on the “international siege” of the Fatherland.

The dictatorship would undoubtedly have preferred to enjoy a more comfortable international position (although by then it was never in real danger, only Argentina under Perón was willing to grant credit in any significant amount). On the other hand, given the darkening international security environment the Franco regime applied itself to hunting for U.S. economic assistance since open political support was still out of the question.

U.S. economic assistance became the litmus test for the acceptance by the United States of the everlasting (“eternal” was the word used) values of the Franco regime. Thanks to the activities of an increasing number of Congressmen, friendly or sufficiently anticommunist, spurred by an effective ambassador and deeply unpleasant hyper-“Francoist”, José Félix de Lequerica, by 1950 the prospects had become less cloudy. (10) A modest credit of \$ 62.5 million signaled the route and the possibilities ahead. The defrosting continued. In July 1951, in his visit to Franco, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, chief of naval operations, found the Spanish dictator far more enthusiastic about a bilateral rapprochement than he had hoped for.

Contrary to frequent allegations, the foundational round was not particularly long or slow. After some exploration of the *terra ignota* that Spain was in the early fifties for the U.S. military and economic authorities, the negotiations took less time than other rounds later on when the issues were clearer and the negotiators knew full well the possibilities and constraints under which they operated. (11)

The U.S. negotiators were experienced in such endeavors. The Spaniards were not. Nothing similar had been previously attempted. The texts put on the table originated with the United States and the Spaniards reacted to them as best they could. This is scarcely good negotiating tactics. An issue led to great difficulties in the future. It was the hard core of the agreements: the conditions under which the United States would be allowed to activate or put in a state of alert the bases and military facilities in view of their use in an armed conflict. The U.S. negotiators obviously wanted to get as blank a check as possible. The dictatorship, not without some misgiving, honored the request albeit not in exactly the same terms as suggested. Face-saving was deemed necessary but, in practice, it did not amount to much. On the military level the Spanish chief negotiator was Lieutenant General Juan Vigón, chief of the Joint Chiefs (Alto Estado Mayor). His name is indelibly bound to the coordinating mechanism that underpinned the German bombing of Guernica during the civil war.

The activation clause (which remained unknown in the public domain until 1979) (12) was not, however, the most difficult issue in the bargaining process. Such honor is due to the economic haggling. Franco was never shy in his requests for such kind of assistance. For this he heavily relied on the expertise and negotiating skills of the Commerce Minister, Manuel Arburúa. Coordination among the Spaniards, or what was claimed to be such, was ensured by Martín Artajo, without any particularly knowledgeable supporting staff. The negotiations were not a high-water mark in the history of Spanish diplomacy. The major Spanish aims were set by General Franco himself who, in the words of the U.S. Ambassador, personally outlined the most important bargaining positions. Franco was always surrounded by that strategic genius, Admiral Carrero Blanco.

The regime sought the greatest possible assistance for its bedraggled Armed Forces and for its rundown economy. The proud Franco Army was good enough for deterring an unlikely domestic insurrection armed with sticks and knives but utterly inappropriate for ensuring Spain's external defense. The inglorious Ifni campaign several years later dramatically revealed this inability. In 1952-53, the dictatorship's bureaucrats confronted hard-nosed negotiators who always underlined that responsibility for appropriations lay with the U.S. Congress and that they could not go beyond certain limits. Given the decisions taken by Congress, it sounded, as Lequerica well knew, like a rather flimsy explanation. There is no doubt that Washington wanted to get the agreement on the cheap. This turned out to be impossible and some way was found to promise the Spaniards more economic assistance.

There are authors whose kindness leads them to extend little less than a toughness certificate to the Spanish negotiators. This assertion is not borne out by facts. The Spaniards were suitably tough in the negotiation of the financial counterpart only. In everything else they were more than accommodating. The concessions they granted were particularly generous in those areas that were of greatest interest to the United States. The range of basing sites, facilities, rights to use the admittedly catastrophic Spanish infrastructure, and the legal and institutional status of the U.S. forces and their dependents were the most important. All of these concessions were outlined not in the texts made public on September 26, 1953, but in a number of agreements that never made it to the public domain. (13)

In 1993 some illustrious voices rose in Spain contesting the present writer's characterization of such arrangements as "secret". Among those the most significant one was that of José María de Areilza, former Ambassador to Washington and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy. While in office, he took care that no confidential clauses adhered to the 1976 treaty. Areilza and Admiral Liberal Lucini alleged, not without reason, that all agreements were known to the civilian and military bureaucracies whose task it was to implement them. (14) True. But that knowledge always remained confined to faithful servants who took the greatest care that the texts would never be submitted to public scrutiny. The U.S. negotiators did not proceed differently. The U.S. Congress was left in total darkness regarding the complementary, but substantial, arrangements. As far as the present writer knows, no U.S. official or semi-official publication ever dared to identify these confidential texts.

However, it was the small letter of the technical agreement of 1953 and, in its wake, of the various procedural agreements subsequently negotiated that meant that the whole of Spain was put at the disposal of the United States (15) to do as it pleased.

In short, the 1952-53 round ended in public and non-public texts. They outlined a wide range of concessions in favor of the United States such as had never occurred in Spanish history. Therefore the reduction and limitation of such self-imposed erosion of the national sovereignty subsequently became one of the major axes of all Spanish efforts to reshape the bilateral relationship. These efforts started as soon as the dictatorship felt safe from international challenges; more or less after the Spanish accession to the United Nations in December 1955. There was another axis: the insistent and enervating request for a suitable compensation (lately in the shape of a mutual defense clause) for the risks incurred by Spain after the breaking of its neutrality policy. The interaction between the two axes shaped all the high and low points of the bilateral relationship during the dictatorship and cast a rather long shadow onto the democratic period which started after the general parliamentary elections of 1977.

Occasionally, the Spanish dissatisfaction with the United States came to the surface in the shackled Spanish media. In the successive negotiation rounds and in the bilateral contacts in between Spanish officials used to argue along easily understandable lines. It was necessary for Spain to gain more open advantages (in equipment, cooperation and defense guarantees) because otherwise Spanish public opinion could feel cheated. This reasoning, although rather unsophisticated, was nevertheless a great headway in comparison with the one used in the 1952 negotiation when it was in all seriousness asserted that since true public opinion did not exist in Spain, the Spanish Government assumed a far greater responsibility when taking decisions that affected the life and well-being of the nation.(16)

Years later, when the 1966 Press Law permitted a modest expression of opinions that were not dictated by the authoritarian bureaucrats or were in accordance with the regime's press directives *à la Goebbels*, the surfaced dissatisfaction was used as an additional weapon. But the Spanish journalists never knew what to expect. A U.S. scholar, MIT professor William Watson, highlighted as an example the case of the newspaper El Correo de Andalucía. It was forced to publish false information to renege on a true story regarding the landing at the Rota naval base of a rather large contingent of U.S. military personnel, mostly from the attack carrier *Saratoga*. The relevance of this episode is that it occurred not in the dark nineteen-fifties but in March 1975. (17)

Who controls the present controls the past and who controls the past controls the future. This pseudo-Orwellian assertion is perfectly applicable to the media profile that accompanied the long-lasting negotiations between the two Governments. What Spain wanted is to shackle off, to the extent possible, the erosion of sovereignty that the dictatorship had agreed to in the foundational round.

Strategic Features of U.S. Negotiating Behavior

Between 1953 and the nineteen-eighties the patterns of U.S. behavior did not substantially alter in view of the impending rounds. Given the high levels of institutional and operational privilege reached, the U.S. interest was always predicated upon the absolute need to keep them or, alternatively, to avoid their erosion as much as possible. The United States followed a very conservative line, keen on the preservation of the status quo.

Evidence of this persistence is shown in the instructions given by Henry A. Kissinger before the last round of negotiations that took place under the dictatorship. They date from September 1974 and identified the following U.S. aims: retention of all the military rights and facilities; resistance to all Spanish efforts to restrict their use in future crises; avoidance of any commitment as far as any security guarantee was concerned; refusal to accept any withdrawals from U.S. forces; and rejection of any responsibilities for liabilities in the nuclear area. On the other hand, Kissinger was in favor of showing the largest possible opening toward the reinforcement of non-military cooperation within acceptable financial constraints. Similar instructions had been given in February 1970, with a fair amount of success. (18)

In implementing its strategy, the United States always held an essential advantage: Franco's ardent, desperate wish to keep Washington's support alive and kicking. The U.S. connection was simply vital for the regime and could not be endangered. Thus the United States and Spain were condemned to agree. They always did, although little by little the Spanish negotiators managed to project alternatives which incidentally had never any follow-up.

The first, and perhaps the most important, pattern was the U.S. willingness to induce, at crisis points, the estrangement of those Spaniards who had become excessively bothersome due to what Washington perceived as inordinate demands or because they showed too much thirst for autonomy. It was possibly not inconsequential that many of the U.S. high-level representatives in Spain, both civilian and military, had wide experience with Latin American countries, where U.S. high-handed behavior was the order of the day.

One of the most conspicuous examples of this behavioral pattern is connected with Fernando María Castiella, a rather nationalistic minded Foreign Minister who was in charge of Spanish diplomacy between 1957 and 1969. Castiella was a cautious man. When he was ready to act, he had his aims approved by none less than the Head of State and the National Defence Council. He was aware that the strategies followed in 1953 and 1963 had led to a dead end for the Spanish side. He held the view that the relationship was too unequal and too unbalanced. It resembled a relationship of

subjugation, not a relationship among friends. Castiella's tactics brought him in collision with some of the most powerful figures of the Spanish military, among them Admiral Carrero Blanco and Captain General Muñoz Grandes. Both fretted because, as they saw it, the tactics of the Foreign Minister put the future of the agreements at risk.

Castiella, although an experienced negotiator, committed a *faux pas* when he stated in Washington that Spain had other alternatives to the maintenance at all costs of the U.S. connection. He cited a hypothetical neutral option. U.S. Ambassador Hill saw red. He held scarcely undisguised ill-feelings towards the Foreign Minister. (19) The U.S. diplomats and military in Madrid duly ascertained that Castiella had not spoken for the Spanish Armed Forces, as always the fundamental piece of the Franco regime, nor for the whole of the cabinet. One should surmise that U.S. displeasure, which could not remain hidden from Carrero Blanco, was one of the factors which strengthened his resolve to have Castiella booted out of the cabinet.

During the democratic period, alleged U.S. manipulation of Spanish political personnel was bound to drastically decrease. Nevertheless, stark press campaigns were directed against Spanish negotiators whose aims seemed to be at variance with U.S. strategic goals. The first campaign was directed against the socialist Foreign Minister Fernando Morán who was portrayed in the media as a subject of ridicule. U.S. Ambassador Enders, as reported by Morán, was ambiguous when he addressed the issue in a heart to heart meeting. The U.S. Government, he is alleged to have said, had too many agencies. He could not categorically assert that none of them was a participant in the campaign. The Embassy, however, was not. (20) Another case of media vilification arose years later and was addressed to the Spanish chief negotiator for the 1996 round, Ambassador Cajal. *Cui bono?* (21)

A second behavioral pattern displayed by the United States was the recourse to *divide et impera* tactics. The United States always found it more difficult to negotiate with hard-headed Spanish diplomats than with the Spanish military, who were anxious not to loosen the contact with their only source of materiel and technical expertise. Well aware of this, the U.S. negotiators tended to exploit the fragmentation and rivalries of the Spanish bureaucracy at leisure. In this respect they usually leaned towards the military although, if necessary, they never hesitated in leading them down the garden path. One egregious example occurred in 1962.

For several months the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had let a number of U.S. military requests pile up so as to build a package for use in the impending negotiations. Some of those requests were very important. The United States sought authorizations for establishing facilities to track nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and under sea, for setting up new radar facilities and, more importantly, for expanding the berthing facilities at the Rota naval base. The idea was to introduce in Rota the modern submarines armed with Polaris missiles.

This issue was of great relevance at the time. The U.S. Government was involved in sharp discussions with some of its NATO partners. Many NATO Governments were not anxious to see Polaris missiles in their harbors or territories. Since the Spanish reply was not forthcoming, the U.S. military got in touch with another of the geniuses who sat at the pinnacle of the Spanish hierarchy, Captain General Muñoz Grandes. He saw no objection in granting the U.S. request. Spanish diplomats

were neither consulted nor informed. They found out at the negotiating table that Spain's major bargaining chip had graciously been given away for nothing.

The Madrid *New York Times* correspondent, Benjamin Welles, found the U.S. military behavior improper. It did not correspond to the cordial climate which characterized the bilateral relationship in whose implementation the Spaniards were prone to over fulfill their commitments. Be it as it may, the United States stubbornly refused to give away the authorization and proceeded to make Rota one of its three largest and most important bases outside continental America for strategic deterrence.

It is no wonder that the 1963 round permitted the United States to test once again the structural weakness of the Spanish negotiating posture. In spite of the most careful preparation, partly under Rovira's supervision, and the positions of General Franco himself, the outcome was particularly meager. The 1953 texts were extended for another five years.

The present writer is a little hesitant in highlighting the third pattern because of its banal character but it must be specifically identified. The United States tended to stick to the exact wording of the agreements concluded with the Spanish regime (although from the Spanish point of view this could mean U.S. actions going against the spirit which animated the texts). On the basis of the wording of the relevant arrangements concluded in the fifties, the United States saw no difficulty in introducing nuclear weapons into Spain and in extensively carrying out overflights of the Spanish territory with nuclear weaponry. To what extent those activities became known to the Spanish authorities is difficult to say. My working hypothesis is that the regime's bureaucrats did not raise many objections since no trace of them was found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the overflights continued for a long time.

It defies belief that either side could have considered this an unimportant issue. From the U.S. point of view, the nuclear bases in what had been the French Protectorate in Morocco would have to be dismantled after Moroccan independence, much to the regret of the political and military authorities. Spain was the obvious place to fall back on. (22)

In these circumstances, in January 1966 the infamous Palomares incident took place. A collision between two U.S. planes along the Spanish shoreline led to the dropping of four H-bombs, one of which slid into the Mediterranean. For the Spaniards it was like a bolt out of the blue. The military ministers, true to form, immediately suggested to hush up the accident. It was impossible to do so. As the scandal, particularly abroad, intensified, much emphasis was placed on the joint swim of Spanish Minister Fraga Iribarne and U.S. Ambassador Biddle Duke in the cold Mediterranean waters. This empathy, proclaimed in the most emphatic tones to the world at large, did not suffice for convincing the United States that something had to be done to Article VII of the 1953 technical (and secret) agreement. This article recognized total freedom for the U.S. forces to move inside Spanish territory, territorial waters and air space. Some headway was made, however, later on in the procedural agreements which were signed in September, 1970.

It is instructive to compare the Palomares accident with the one that occurred two years later at the Thule air base in Greenland. The Danes experienced the same nuclear *frisson* but negotiated a formal agreement designed to prevent such accidents occurring in the future. Admittedly, this agreement was confidential. Nevertheless, years later the Danish Government commissioned a full study of the Thule case and published it. The reports made by the Spanish military are still awaiting their exploitation by historians. Even under the Spanish democratic system there was never any attempt to clarify this rather murky episode.

The fourth behavioral pattern was the systematic use of multifarious requests. In the democratic period, a Center for National Defense Studies (CESEDEN) report stated in careful language that there had been “a certain” lack of control on the Spanish side regarding U.S. requests and desiderata. The United States used to insist once and again on their demands and were prone to shuttle patiently among the different layers of authority and the Spanish agencies concerned until they found one which was willing to grant their wishes. Given the typical disorganization of the state apparatus dealing with foreign and security policies during the dictatorship, the United States usually obtained what it had set its heart on. Thus, the U.S. military had been highly successful in extending the range of facilities and their unconstrained use although their requests had occasionally very little to do with a clear cut defense interest and responded more to conveniences of the armed services. The 1953 imbalance had become ever more disturbing.

The CESEDEN experts should not have been surprised. The above pattern was induced by the non-public texts and the dynamics of the foundational round. Via technical arrangements, procedural agreements, developmental stipulations, the regulations on the use of specific facilities, the actual practices, a myriad of factual understandings among local military authorities, an attitude of mere tolerance and, in general, a *laissez faire* attitude at many echelons of the Spanish bureaucracy, a dense jungle of impenetrable regulations had arisen. Such regulations were disconnected, disjointed, incomprehensible and very little known in their entirety.

Large parts of this jungle had remained unsupervised for years, and certainly by the few experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The difficulties of reviewing the concessions given to the United States were aggravated by the secrecy which surrounded such issues and by the rivalry between the civilian and military sectors of the Franco bureaucracy. The pathetic outcome came to the surface as soon as the incipient democratic system tackled the burning question of how to redress the imbalances. In the exchange of letters annexed to the 1976 treaty, the Spanish chief negotiator implied that the Ministry did not know the full extent of the facilities enjoyed by the United States in Spain. (23)

Spanish Strategic Behavior

In order to facilitate comparisons, four behavioral patterns will also be identified on the Spanish side during the Franco years. The first was a cover up of the extreme dependence into which the regime had fallen with respect to the vital U.S. support. Over time the negotiation rounds on how to improve and update the agreements became acrimonious on the operational level among the negotiators themselves. The Spaniards

were furious at what they perceived as stone-walling. The strident tunes which accompanied the negotiations were, however, a face saving exercise. Those in a position of almost untrammelled power in Spain like General Franco or Admiral Carrero Blanco were never ready to put the relationship at risk. It is true that in some of their internal musings occasionally a longing toward a strong or forceful feature became apparent. But it is not less true that neither of them ever dared to put those longings to the test. Unable to project a viable alternative, the Spanish negotiators were forced to concentrate on the counterparts. It is on this level that the haggling was fierce. There is nothing strange in it. If this issue had been the most significant one in the 1952-53 round, when the regime's position was weakest, its salience was stepped up dramatically in the successive rounds. The most acerbic level was reached in 1975. Nevertheless, one should not overstretch this pattern. It uneasily coexisted with the inexplicable tendency to give the best trump cards away before each round. The archival evidence does not permit to infer the reasons for this behavior. It may have to do with a naive belief that in so doing a climate could be created which would be more amenable towards Spanish desiderata. If this was indeed the case, it was a very strange strategy and it almost never reached its goals.

The authorization for the introduction of Polaris submarines in Rota is possibly the most significant case but not the only one. Another example is connected with the consequences of the dismantling of the Wheelus air base in Libya. Under the Libyan Monarchy, the relationship with the United States had deteriorated and Libyan nationalists had found political capital in their requests that the United States move out of Wheelus. In Madrid contingency plans ought to have been prepared for the time when this happened because it was likely that the United States would then fall back on Spain. When the United States did in fact leave Wheelus after Colonel Ghadafi's coup in September 1969, Washington requested the reactivation of the Saragossa air base. It was granted although the experience had shown that in the then current negotiations for improving the agreements such an authorization was, like Rota had been several years earlier, a possible trump card.

Another example: one of the longest-lasting contentious issues was the adaptation of the institutional framework which provided for the legal treatment of U.S. forces in Spain. The 1953 arrangements were literally appalling and had not been readjusted in 1963. In the wake of this experience, Castiella took a firmer position. While Spaniards and Americans confronted the challenges of the 1968 round, what did the regime do in this particular area? It granted additional privileges to U.S. personnel, far beyond the ones enjoyed by foreign diplomats. Furthermore it extended them to other U.S. citizens although they had nothing to do with the agreements and even accepted that on the bases the U.S. military declared an ever larger number of areas out of bounds to the Spaniards. This, at least, rankled with the Spanish military and encouraged them to launch a counteroffensive as soon as circumstances permitted.

The second pattern was the permanent Spanish willingness to indulge in drafting exercises and linguistic contortions to induce the United States toward accepting something that nobody in Washington wanted: a security guarantee in favor of Spain. In 1963, 1968, 1970, and 1974, enormous efforts were deployed to this end. The approaches did not change very much. They were predicated upon the fact that Spain had become belligerent in the East-West conflict. What lay behind this request was, however, the wish to apply U.S. political support to the Spanish security scenarios in

North Africa. This support was a vital component of Franco's deterrence mechanism but a guarantee would come in handy. It flew into better insights held by experienced Spanish diplomats. In an internal note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following was stated: "We know full well because the Americans have told us so with all clarity that if there were a conflict between Spain and Morocco, the U.S. would wash off its hands. The only thing it would do would be to use its good offices so that the situation could be solved in a peaceful way. In a case of war, we do not know to what extent we might use the U.S. materiel and the bases for the defense of our cities [Ceuta and Melilla] and our African provinces". After the dramatic experience a few years earlier of the unavailability of U.S. materiel to deal with the troubles in Ifni (one of the African colonies still held by Spain) those were indeed sobering words.

The third pattern arose out of the need to overcome the permanent inability of the Spanish dictatorship to organize itself in a manner conducive to present a united front to tough U.S. negotiators. The regime was unable to overcome a fateful decoupling between the military Ministries and Foreign Affairs, between the latter and the Ministry of Finance and the remaining economic Ministries and the internecine rivalries among the three service Ministries over the allocation of U.S. military assistance. Even in the darkest years, in that time in which the dictatorship was all-powerful, the civil service quasi-militarized, and the bureaucrats more authoritarian than ever, *i.e.* when the system ought to have worked best under the line of command which started with General Franco, what was the underlying reality? The prosaic reality, as revealed in internal documents, was one of systemic disorganization. There were many services concerned with U.S. relations. In the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce several Directorates General were active. In the service Ministries there were liaison committees. The Chiefs of Staff (Alto Estado Mayor) had also something to say. And, obviously, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Spain could not be ignored. All of them were represented in the Office of the Cabinet Committee for the Implementation of the Agreements. In practice, however, the civilian and military officials concerned with such offices (led by Rovira) did not always represent the points of view of their departments. The Cabinet Committee itself left much to be desired. Although several cabinet ministers sat on it, it was not a decision-making body as other cabinet committees were. If it did not act by consensus, the impact of its deliberations was likely to be nil. The Head of State and Prime Minister (General Franco) did not attend its meetings for many years and was not familiar with many of the big and small problems of the relationship. The outcome was, in such an authoritarian regime, a broad operational weakness at the center of the bureaucratic machinery. Obviously, the situation somewhat improved with the passing of time. In the 1974-75 round, for example, the combined efforts deployed by Rovira (by then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs) and General Gutiérrez Mellado were a high-powered first move to tackle those administrative shortcomings.

The fourth pattern grew out of such experience. It related to the need to generate some countervailing power against the effects of lax policy-making in the supervision and control of the facilities and privileges granted to the United States. Over the years a fundamental drift toward the pell-mell enlargement of such privileges had become apparent. The mechanism which in 1953 was easily understandable (authorizations in favor of the U.S. deterrent handled by the Strategic Air Command) had ended up being no more than an ungainly *potpourri*. The facilities had become a heterogeneous lump without a clear purpose or justification. By 1975 there was the result of incoherent U.S.

pressures linked to the support of the U.S. deterrent for ensuring the security of the West (the defense motive) but also of the particular conveniences of the various U.S. services (bureaucratic infighting) or even of the desire to save expenditures (cost cutting exercises across the board).

On this Spanish side the *potpourri* was the ineluctable outcome of domestic pressures, such as the extensive use of the 1953 secret arrangements, the granting of additional concessions outside the negotiating rounds, and de facto tolerance. All this created a situation of confusion in which the Spaniards themselves did not know what the United States was enjoying, how and why.

This somber analysis is the counter image of what the regime used to say publicly in order to reassure a misinformed and therefore gullible public opinion. The following statement by a prestigious Air Force Lieutenant General, Fernández-Longoria, can serve as an example:

All the Spaniards know that our negotiators, now and before, would never make the slightest concession [in terms of sovereignty]. All the world, Spaniards and foreigners alike, know without the shadow of a doubt that he who has to orientate and eventually decide on what is being negotiated is the most jealous, the most intransigent and the firmest defender of the national integrity and sovereignty that Spain ever had in its history (...) The terms of the agreement and of its procedural arrangements, as well as their implementation, are absolutely reassuring. There is not the slightest cession nor any mortgage for the future...

Fortunately, in spite of all archival depredations, there still exists such a stock of documentary evidence that historians are in a position to put these kinds of proud, and numerous, statements to an acid test. This test is absolutely essential to deepen our knowledge of the internal workings of the Franco dictatorship, so strong in face of its subjects, so weak in the international sphere.

Negotiations during the Democratic Period

Given the historical background outlined in the preceding pages, it should not be a cause for wonder that the foreign and security policies of the incipient Spanish democracy immediately wrestled with a fundamental issue. What to do in order to rebalance the U.S.-Spanish relationship?

The answer was pragmatic and evolved around two movements. In the first one, a sort of curtain raiser in 1981-82, a new equilibrium was found between Spanish and U.S. commitments. In the second one, the Spanish aim was to give a completely new orientation to the relationship by putting it on a different conceptual and political foundation. This happened in the 1986-88 negotiating round.

The task was not easy for two major reasons: i) The United States was used to thinking of the relationship in military terms only (bases and geography in return for a limited amount of military assistance). For the Spaniards, however, the relationship was essentially political. (24) ii) The United States had been willing, in 1975, to give a new embrace to the dying dictatorship so as to get a guarantee of continuous free access to the bases and facilities. Only General Franco's death had prevented it from doing so. Spaniards were well aware of this overwhelming U.S. interest and of the fact that U.S.

support, if transferred to the incipient Monarchy, would be a very positive asset in the evolving political situation.

On the other hand, three factors should be mentioned which could be made to work in favor of the Spanish positions.

First and foremost, the fact that the U.S. Congress was keen on giving a political signal in support of what was perceived as a political change in Spain that could point to the establishment of a democratic system. The role of the U.S. Congress at this juncture could not be easily dismissed. For domestic reasons it had requested that the results of the 1974-75 negotiations be formally submitted to it. This would have been a first. Also for domestic reasons, the Ford Administration had agreed to do so. Secretary of State Kissinger had doubts, however, that Spain could easily evolve into a democratic system and did not put too much hope in the leadership qualities of H. M. King Juan Carlos, something that he conveniently forgot to mention in his not always trustworthy memoirs.

The second factor was the increasing quality of the thinking of Spanish officials, both civilian and military, over what was working and not working in the bilateral relationship. In particular some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ferociously attacked the “basket theory” which had become the basic conceptual foundation for policy-making in Spain vis-à-vis the United States. This theory stated that the shortcomings in one basket (security, for example) could be overcome by increasing the content of other baskets (the economy, cooperation activities, education). A Spanish diplomat, Carlos Fernandez Espeso, (25) was particularly scathing in his criticism. If the security basket was half empty, nothing could be done to straighten the imbalances in the bilateral relationship by way of half-filling the remaining baskets. Another diplomat, José Manuel Allendesalazar, was highly critical of the concession granting policy as it had so far been implemented. The Spanish Embassy in Washington, under the leadership of Ambassador José Lladó, made an exhaustive comparative analysis of the institutional underpinnings of the bilateral relationship and highlighted most of its weaknesses.

The third factor was the evidence that it was possible to make substantial headway via negotiations. In early 1976 the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, de Areilza, on the basis of what had been achieved in the still unfinished round, deftly convinced Kissinger of the need to give a strong political signal of support to the fledgling Spanish polity, laboring under the iron cast of its recent past. The relationship, based on successive executive agreements, was elevated to the dignity of a Treaty, to which the U.S. Senate gave its consent. This was, incidentally, the most important political signal given by the United States in support of a democratic Monarchy. The withdrawal of Poseidon submarines from Rota was agreed. These were, among others, important signs which gave Spanish policy-makers hope that fundamentals of the relationship could indeed be changed.

The 1981-82 negotiations were still shaped by some of the features so prominent in the past. Many of the issues under discussion were well known to the negotiators of both sides. They were also of considerable political importance and therefore highly sensitive. The round was characterized by the fact that from the very beginning the Spaniards took the initiative after careful preparation and put draft texts on the table.

Something similar had been done in 1970 but the results were poor. This time, the Spaniards were much more ambitious and the U.S. negotiators, although realizing that some of the drafts seemed to be hasty documents, had per force to react to the same. It soon became clear that the Spanish intention was to restrict to the maximum extent possible the large margins of maneuver that the United States enjoyed in using the bases and facilities.

A reflection of the past was the Spanish inability to stick to the Treaty level. The Government did not take into account the previous recommendations of the Embassy in Washington and settled for a downgrading of the legal basis of the relationship to the level of executive agreements once again. In view of the present writer, this was a grievous mistake although the real reasons for accepting such downgrading are still unclear.

The agreements reached in 1982 were gladly accepted by the United States. One of the U.S. negotiators was to imply later on that he would be surprised if the Spaniards were as happy as the Americans. (26) This alone indicates that there was still a long way to go. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the importance of the 1982 texts. In particular, the long festering dispute about the institutional arrangements for the U.S. forces in Spain found a preliminary solution based on the models applied within the Atlantic Alliance.

By then the Spanish Government led by Señor Calvo Sotelo had taken the strategic decision to apply for NATO membership. For a while the negotiations were based on two assumptions: the possibility of NATO membership and its alternative that Spain would not enter. The United States was extremely favorable to such change of direction in Spanish foreign and security policies. It had wanted Spain in NATO for a long time and had labored endlessly although futilely to that end. Franco's Spain had always been confronted with the impossibility of acceding to such a body. Democratic Spain had no difficulties.

In fact, the difficulties that the Calvo Sotelo Government had to confront were basically domestic. All the Spanish Left was dead set against NATO membership. The issue was fought over with almost religious zeal. The Government never convinced the Left and the Left felt overpowered and frustrated. Although the U.S. connection also arose passions, both the Socialist and the Communist parties did not object to its continuation.

Be it as it may, in the October 1982 general elections, when the new executive agreement was still pending parliamentary ratification, the Socialist opposition achieved an overwhelming victory. It was the first time in Spanish history that the Socialist party, illegal until 1977, formed the Government all by itself. In their electoral platform the Socialists had taken the commitment to submit NATO membership to the Spanish people via a referendum.

Those who tackled in the 1983-88 period the burning issue of how to relate to the United States had grown in a political and ideological tradition that was very different from that of previous Governments and which was also at variance with U.S. perceptions. In particular what for the United States had always been a cooperative and non-problematic effort to enhance Western defense against the Bolshevik evil-doers was

for the Socialists in the new Government a relationship which grew its roots in the needs of a dictatorial system which had deprived the Spaniards of their inalienable freedoms. It was therefore a relationship that had to be modernized and harmonized with the new circumstances. The United States was never left to ponder about this interpretation. In a seminal speech at the Wilson Center in Washington in September 1985, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez forcefully stated:

We should not be surprised that those defeated in the civil war and the democratic opposition in general should have viewed these treaties as American support for the dictatorship and a blow for the hopes of a rapid democratic restoration in Spain. (27)

This speech was given after Gonzalez met with Secretary Shultz and President Reagan. In the meeting with the former, as Gonzalez told it later on, Shultz had indicated that the United States was not used to staying where it was not wanted. If the Spaniards gave the impression that they did not want the United States to stay in Spain, well then the United States would go. The Prime Minister replied that that was not what he wanted. However, if the United States wished to leave Spain it would be necessary to start discussing the modalities of its exit. What is important here is to point out that this reaction was not something that any of González's predecessors would instinctively have had.

The new Government wanted to substantially change a relationship that was not in accordance with Spain's political and institutional evolution. Speaking historically, one could engage in scholarly discussions as to whether Spain under the Franco dictatorship had or had not become a sort of vassal of the United States. (28) Politically the kind of relationship which had been inherited was resented as a sign of contractual dependence. Many people on the Left in Spain would concur with this. What was new was that there was a Government bent upon acting in favor of its transformation.

Immediately upon taking office a team of experts, under the direct supervision of the new Foreign Minister Fernando Morán was tasked to unlink the still unratified agreement from any standard manifestation of NATO membership. Later on, some research was conducted so as to identify the major features that had characterized the implementation of the bilateral agreements in the past. In spite of some rumors in the media, no serious consideration was given to canceling the relationship. The Government was keen on maintaining the security levels which the West had grown accustomed to and was not willing to introduce elements of uncertainty in the international security scene.

This posture was appreciated in Washington. What the United States did not appreciate was the Spanish intention of reshaping the foundations of the agreements. From the Spanish perspective at the time it was essential to make headway in the following areas:

- i) Agree on a non-cosmetic but reasonable and flexible reduction of the U.S. military presence in Spain. What Kissinger had feared in 1970 and 1974 would now come to pass.
- ii) Adapt the contractual provisions to a new setting based upon mutual respect, sovereign equality of the two parties, and a fair burden-sharing of the

defense effort, resolutely discarding any shadow of subordination to purely U.S. interests.

- iii) Reshape, to the greatest possible extent, the procedures and control systems of the authorizations to use the support facilities by the U.S. forces. This reshaping exercise should also cover logistics, overflights, resupplying, training, and prepositioning. The burning issue of out of area operations had already given the Spaniards some headache since 1973. This preoccupation had to be dealt with effectively.
- iv) Separate the security and defense relationship from any other kind. Economic, industrial, cooperation relations were undoubtedly important but their treatment would have to be handled separately from the hard core of the agreements which was strictly politico-military.
- v) Update the provisions relating to manpower and privileges, closing some of the gaps which had appeared in the implementation of the 1982 agreement.

Perhaps the most important strategic decision was to approach the negotiations from the point of view of the respective contributions to collective defense without any interference, with counterparts to be allocated to separate baskets. This was a substantial break with the consolidated tradition of Spaniards crying for more and more assistance to which the U.S. negotiators had grown accustomed. Suddenly, the U.S. side was confronted with a situation in which their counterparts did not seem to be particularly interested in the materiel the United States had to offer.

Even retired Admiral Liberal Lucini, critical of the position taken by the Spanish negotiators, freely acknowledged that the successive previous agreements “really contributed very little to the material solution of the problems facing the Spanish Armed Forces. The general impression held by the Spanish military was, in fact, that the agreements were used as a cover for the political needs of the various Governments.”

In the early high-level skirmishes Secretary Shultz raised the issue of the financial conditions that the United States usually granted to Spain for the acquisition of military hardware. Gonzalez replied that he was not interested in such conditions. If the United States was in need of credits, Spain was ready to grant Washington some to the extent of its possibilities. There is no reason to believe that the offer was anything but well-meant.

In short, the climate in which the bilateral relationship was developing had undergone a fundamental change. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, addressed Secretary Shultz in the following terms: “What we want is a balanced relationship, not subordination. We want a relationship between allies, we want a relationship between equals, we do not want a military overextension.” These were desiderata which for many years had been lurking in the background on the Spanish side. There had never been an opportunity to put them to the test, nor to act upon them.

However, in the 1986-88 round the Spanish negotiating position was, for the first time since 1953, very strong: Spain was a confirmed NATO member by then. The

Socialist Government had won the referendum on remaining as a member of the Atlantic Alliance. The Spanish people had given their consent to the conditions with which the Government had clad its request. One of them was the downsizing of the U.S. military presence in Spain. There was no possibility of contesting the outcome of the legitimate expression of the popular will. The Spanish negotiating team, led by Ambassador Cajal, had thus very strong cards up their sleeves. Nevertheless, some of the most difficult issues had to be sorted out by the Minister of Defense, Narcís Serra, with U.S. Ambassador Bartholomew.

The round ended on the defense cooperation agreement of December 1, 1988. In the history of the bilateral relationship this agreement is the exact counterpoint of what the Franco regime had consented to in 1953. The enshrined imbalances, dependence, and trends toward a lack of proper supervision of U.S. activities in Spain were transformed into a well-balanced compact of duties, rights and responsibilities strictly respecting the full sovereignty of both parties. It is obvious that the contractual basis is not the only mechanism that determines policy alignments. When the Socialist party was voted out of office in 1996, the conservative Government, for instance, stuck for years to the 1988 agreement. It negotiated and signed in April 2002 a protocol to amend some of the provisions but has considerably gravitated toward U.S. positions as the second Iraq war amply demonstrated. However, a poor contractual basis with an unbalanced defense component largely predetermines a certain line of behavior and constrains the possibilities of upkeeping specific national interests. This is one of the lessons which can be drawn from the history of the successive rounds in which Spaniards and Americans negotiated and renegotiated the 1953 agreements.

In support of this thesis, one should also examine the circumstances in which the bases that the United States established in Spain in the late nineteen-fifties were activated or put on a state of alert. The provisions which governed what was after all the rationale for the 1953 agreements run under the anodyne and innocent sounding title of “Note pursuant to the second paragraph of Article III of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953.”

What should undoubtedly be called a clause for war time activation of the bases contemplated two scenarios. The first one was identified as follows:

In case of evident Communist aggression which threatens the security of the West, U.S. forces may make use of the areas and facilities situated in Spanish territory as bases for action against military objectives, in such manner as may be necessary for the defense of the West, provided that, when this situation arises, both countries communicate to each other, with the maximum urgency, their information and intentions.

The second scenario referred to less serious cases as follows:

In other cases of emergency or of threat of aggression to the security of the West, the timing and manner of utilization of the areas and facilities situated in Spanish territory would be the subject of urgent consultation between both governments, and will be determined in the light of the circumstances of the situation which had developed. (29)

The additional note to Article III, as it was known, was in full force until 1970 when it was replaced, after years of constant Spanish efforts, by a less threatening formulation which was duly made public. (30)

Needless to say, both scenarios contained a large measure of ambiguity. What could be understood as “evident Communist aggression which threatens the security of the West?” Even an attack by the USSR or one of its allies in a remote area would have allowed the United States to use the bases. There was absolutely nothing which impeded the immediate use of the bases and facilities for war purposes. It was solely up to the U.S. authorities to determine the way in which they would use them.

The scenarios did not in any way define those geographic areas which, when threatened, could lead to the activation of the bases in Spain. Neither did the scenarios contemplate what should be understood as aggression.

For years Spanish officials unsuccessfully compared the disparities between the above formulations and the clauses that appeared in other agreements signed by the United States. It was an exercise in frustration. In the agreements signed with the Republic of Korea (October 1, 1953), China (December 2, 1954) and Japan (January 19, 1960), to cite but a few cases, the area of an eventual attack was carefully delineated. It was the area in which, if an aggression occurred, the contracting parties would face the common danger in accordance with their own constitutional procedures. Both notions were late in coming to the U.S.-Spanish relationship.

Fortunately, the bases and facilities were activated several times, five to be exact. It is thus possible to test the implementation of the additional note to Article III and its 1970 formulation.

In three of the five cases Spanish authorization was forthcoming. Not so in the others. Authorizations were given the first time the bases were put on a state of alert because of the 1958 Lebanon crisis. Subsequently they were also given in relation with the U.S. evacuation of the Congo in 1964, and Libya in 1969. A monographic study should establish to what extent the conditions stipulated in the clause were fulfilled. In the present writer’s view it seems, *prima facie*, that the Spaniards were kind and receptive to U.S. wishes, as it has been argued before. It is difficult to see in the three occasions “Communist aggressions” or “threats to the security of the West”.

There were, however, another two occasions when Spanish sovereignty was put to the test. The first one was related to the Cuban missile crisis in 1961. The bases were activated without having provided the Spanish Government with the appropriate information. The situation was so confusing that the proud dictatorship did not know whether the crisis was taking place in the Caribbean or Berlin. The United States

pleaded communication difficulties. Nevertheless, the conduit chosen, the U.S. military commander in Spain, was too low a level. The Spaniards resented this although the cabinet met and practically gave its blessing minutes before the war time activation.

The second occasion related to the Yom Kippur war. U.S. aircraft based in Torrejón refueled U.S. planes supplying Israel. The Spanish radar detected these moves which were in total contradiction with the strict neutrality declared by the Spanish Government. There was literally no possible defense for U.S. actions. No wonder they were hurriedly hushed up by both sides. (31)

Both cases, Cuba and Yom Kippur, generated among senior Spanish officials deep bitterness. Since 1976 one of the Spanish obsessions was to make the use of the facilities in Spain fool proof and to identify with the greatest possible precision the parameters under which out of area missions could be started by the United States from bases in Spain. When Washington suggested some kind of support during the Libyan crisis in April 1986, the request was flatly refused. All other NATO members, except the UK, did the same. However, during the first Iraq war, Spain did not hesitate in providing political, logistical and intelligence support. It was not a unilateral U.S. decision but an action undertaken in accordance with international law.

Conclusions

It is a *lieu commun* to refer to the Napoleonic maxim that geography determines destiny. History also weighs upon human perceptions and it is therefore one of the factors which determines positions and, occasionally, actions. The past has shaped some very clear positions among many Spaniards vis-à-vis the United States. This outcome has very clear contours which are distinguishable from those prevailing in the rest of Europe.

In General Franco's ascension to his particular brand of *Führertum* the Fascist powers played a rather important role. However, it was the Cold War context which enabled Franco to be consolidated. The old comrade of the Fascist dictators deftly aligned himself with the leading democratic power and entered into a pact with the United States far wider and more resilient than his flirting with the Third Reich had ever been.

For the vanquished Spanish democrats, this new alignment had consequences which were at a variance with those undergone by other Western Europeans, either those who had suffered under the Nazi boot or those Nazis who were quick to convert to the anticommunist cause.

In Germany or Italy, for example, the democratization process was vigorously stimulated by the United States. Some of its connotations were bitter. No accounts were settled with most of the Nazi dignitaries, luminaries and officials. In Italy, the *volte face* of 1943 permitted the new Republic to safely claim a small place among the victors, and the United States contributed to the country's political stabilization. The United States spilled the blood of its youth to free the subjugated peoples. The Norwegians and Danes won their liberties by the defeat of the Third Reich, something unthinkable without the

U.S. offensive across France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. (32) Finally, the United States also prevented Greece, enmeshed in a bitter civil war, from falling into Communist hands.

Nothing remotely similar happened in Spain. After the universal rejoicing brought about by the defeat of the Axis, many believed that the Franco regime, a relic of the past, would soon pass on. This was not to be. U.S. policies went a long way toward ensuring Franco's respectability in power. Obviously, many figures in the U.S. establishment did not like Franco or his regime. What counted, however, was Spain's geo-strategic situation and the strained Cold War parameters. The United States did not bring to Spain a message of liberty and freedom. Instead it limited itself to support the existing regime. Over time, the relationship between the United States and the Spanish dictatorship acquired symbiotic tones. Even when Franco was about to die, what interested the United States was essentially the guarantee of access to the bases and facilities in Spain that should be as free of constraints as possible.

This historical past is something which differentiates the U.S. embrace of Spain and the support offered to the Western democracies, be they the old ones or the new democratic systems of Germany and Italy. It is an experience far away from the focus on human rights and democratic freedoms which the United States highlighted after the implosion of the Soviet empire in its political and economic assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries. Even more so, the United States, as the leading member of the Atlantic Alliance, was very determined to prevent a geo-strategic vacuum in the middle of Europe and set out to integrate the new European actors into the collective security mechanisms. There is no wonder that Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and others have remained so grateful to the United States.

Again in this respect the Spanish experience is in stark contrast. For over twenty years, the untrammled handling of bases and facilities in Spain was the alpha and omega of U.S. policies towards the regime. Whatever changes were brought to bear on the relationship came from the Spanish side, usually after intense diplomatic haggling under adverse conditions. While Western European countries worried over the post-Franco period and started building bridges toward the political opposition, whether "tame" (33) or less tame, the United States remained essentially concerned about its access and transit rights.

Further work in archives still under lock and key would undoubtedly add to our knowledge of the formulation of foreign policy and the internal workings of the Spanish dictatorship. Anything that clarifies obscure or hidden points will surely benefit democratic Spain. And, in this case, it would also lead to a beneficial understanding –a more balanced understanding- between both countries.

The contribution made by Spain to Western defense was not negligible. But as soon as Franco disappeared from the scene, on his way to God and the judgment of History, all the Governments of the new Spanish democracy were bent on achieving a rebalancing of the relationship with the leading Western power. *Por algo será.*

Notes

- (1) Viñas, 2003. This book contains extensive references to the documentary evidence on which the following argument is based.
- (2) All of this means that some existing treatments are likely to become obsolete, including perhaps those of the present writer. One which is totally obsolete is Rubottom and Murphy.
- (3) The uniqueness deriving from this combination is not found in other European countries where the United States established a permanent military presence in the course of the Cold War.
- (4) See for instance the recent state of play study by Ros Agudo.
- (5) Ireland was a part of the First World War as a part of the British Empire. Portugal and Turkey were then belligerent, neutral in the Second World War and part and parcel of the Alliance during the Cold War. Finland was neutralized but it had bravely fought against the USSR in the early forties.
- (6) The image of the United States in Spain can be followed in a recent article by Alonso Zaldívar.
- (7) Edwards has monographically studied this little known episode.
- (8) Iñiguez Jarque, p. 196.
- (9) There is a wide range of literature expounding U.S. struggles in the defense of democracy and human rights. One of its most articulate proponents, Smith, is careful not to mention the Spanish case. Alternatively, U.S. support for unsavory dictatorships is well documented. A rather shameful case is Chile. See the book by Kornbluh. Joffrin has recently written about the Chilean case as follows: "*Les Etats-Unis, si souvent engagés pour la démocratie, s'en méfiaient dans leur arrière-cour latine. En Amérique du Sud, la défense du 'camp de la liberté' excluait la liberté des peuples.*" The same paradox could be applied to the Spanish case.
- (10) The only biography of Lequerica available is that by Cava Mesa.
- (11) The contours of the foundational round have been illuminated by Liedtke.
- (12) It was made public for the first time in Viñas *et al.* pp. 769-770.
- (13) In Viñas, 1981.
- (14) One ludicrous episode must be mentioned. The 1953 texts were replaced by new procedural agreements in September 1970. These were made public by the Department of State (in the Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6977) but the dictatorship never accepted their publication in Spain.

(15) This is the thought-provoking metaphor used to describe the ensuing situation by Ambassador Rovira, a self-proclaimed fervent admirer of General Franco. He was one of the very few Spanish officials who followed the implementation of the agreements from 1953 to 1975, and the chief negotiator during the fourth round.

(16) Such was the argument presented to the presumably baffled U.S. negotiators by the then Undersecretary for Foreign Economic Affairs Jaime Argüelles.

(17) This grotesque episode is cited in Chavkin *et al.*, pp. 56-57.

(18) Gerald F. Ford Library: National Security Decision Memorandum 268. Renegotiation of Bases Agreement with Spain. September 10, 1974. National Security Archive: National Security Decision Memorandum 43, February 20, 1970.

(19) These feelings were well known to the Francoist Information Minister, Fraga Iribarne, forty years later still one of the pillars of the Spanish right.

(20) Morán, p. 254.

(21) The present writer is well aware of the conjectural nature of such allegations. Given time and access to the archives of the relevant U.S. agencies, they may be disproved.

(22) The introduction of nuclear weapons in Morocco predated the storage of such armament in the United Kingdom. They remained in Morocco until September 1963.

(23) In a letter to Ambassador McCloskey exchanged on January 24, 1976, Ambassador Rovira stated: "*I must reiterate my Government's wish that a stock taking exercise be launched regarding the facilities and the list mentioned in Art. I [of the complementary agreement]. It should be completed within 90 days from today.*"

(24) Among the U.S. diplomats in Madrid, this divergence of views was well known. The sometime *chargé d'affaires* and minister counselor, Samuel D. Eaton, refers to it in his memoirs.

(25) The present writer's recent book is dedicated *inter alia* to Ambassador Fernández Espeso's memory.

(26) In his own words: "Unlike most negotiations where there are ups and downs, compromises on both sides, and finally a satisfactory agreement, the 1982 agreement ended on a down note with the Spaniards unhappy (...) I would be very surprised if that approach succeeded with them in the future." Planty, p. 42.

(27) González, p. 180.

(28) This article follows a structural approach. However, the human element must not be forgotten. Castiella felt deeply humiliated by the treatment meted out to him in Washington. In the 1974-75 round, the Spanish military negotiator, General Gutiérrez Mellado, a very distinguished officer who subsequently became Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister during the democratic period, is reported to have said that

the first goal of the Spanish team was to impede the Americans from treating them like sepoys (Puell, p. 172). The same expression circulated in the corridors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Ambassador Fernández Espeso.

(29) My own translation from the Spanish. The present writer has not seen the version in English. The U.S. Government never made public the war time activation clause. However, in FRUS 1952-1954, vol. VI, doc. 885, there is a preliminary version as follows: “In the event of Communist aggression, or imminence thereof, which threatens the security of the West, U.S. forces may immediately make such use of agreed areas and facilities stipulated in this agreement as may be necessary for the defense of the West; provided that when the need for such use becomes apparent, the United States will immediately so inform the Spanish Government. Should the United States wish to use the agreed areas and facilities for combat purposes as a result of the emergence of any other situation than above specified, such use will be subject to prior consultations between the two Governments.” The idea of covering this hard core of the 1953 agreement in an additional paragraph in the technical (secret) agreement originated with the United States.

(30) In Article 34 of the August 6, 1970 agreement reading as follows: “In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities referred to in this Chapter to meet such threat or attack will be the subject of urgent consultations between the two Governments, and will be resolved by mutual agreement in light of the situation created. Such urgent consultations shall take place in the Joint Committee, but when the imminence of the danger so requires, the two Governments will establish direct contact in order to resolve the matter jointly. Each Government retains, however, the inherent right of self-defense.”

(31) Kissinger does not mention the incident in his memoirs. Notwithstanding, the breach of Spanish policy became known both in Spain and in the United States although primary evidence was not provided. In Dobrowski’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, reference is made to an internal U.S. document illuminating the case.

(32) Stephen E. Ambrose has forcefully narrated the contribution of the American GIs in liberating Western Europe from Fascism. The present writer, having lived outside Spain in several member states of the European Union for many years, is well aware of the role played by the United States in keeping the Western European nations safe from Communism.

(33) That was the adjective used by U.S. Ambassador Wells Stabler.

Bibliography

- Alonso Zaldivar, Carlos. "Miradas torcidas. Percepciones mutuas entre España y Estados Unidos." www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/60.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
- Cava Mesa, María Jesús. Los diplomáticos de Franco. J. F. de Lequerica. Temple y tenacidad (1890-1963). Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1989.
- Chavkin, Samuel, *et al.* Spain: Implications for United States Foreign Policy. Stanford: Greylock Publishers, 1976.
- de Areilza, José María. "En el cuarenta aniversario de los acuerdos hispano-norteamericanos." Política Exterior. Fall 1993.
- Dobrowski, John R. The United States, NATO and the Spanish Bases, 1949-1989. Kent State University, 1996.
- Eaton, Samuel D. The Forces of Freedom in Spain 1974-1979. A Personal Account. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.
- Edwards, Jill. Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945-1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
- Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Western Europe and Canada, 1952-1954, vol. VI, Part 2, GPO, Washington DC, 1986.
- González, Felipe. "A New International Role for a Modernizing Spain" in Clark, Robert P. and Haltzel, Michael H. (eds.). Spain in the 1980s. The Democratic Transition and a New International Role. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987.
- Jarque Iñiguez, Arturo. "Queremos esas bases". El acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco. Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, 1998.
- Joffrin, Laurent. "L'espérance assassinée." Le Nouvel Observateur. September 11-17, 2003.
- Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File. New York: New Press, 2003.
- Liberal Lucini, Angel. "Cuarenta años después (1953-1993)." Política Exterior. Fall 1983.
- Liedtke, Boris N. Embracing a Dictatorship. U.S. Relations with Spain, 1945-1953. London: Macmillan, 1998.
- Morán, Fernando. España en su sitio. Plaza & Janes, Espulgues de Llobregat, 1990.

- Planty, Donald J. "The 1983 Agreement on Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation: Overview of the Negotiations", in McDonald, Jr., John W. and Bendahmane, Diane B. (eds.). U.S. Bases Overseas. Negotiations with Spain, Greece and the Philippines. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Puell de la Villa, Fernando. Gutiérrez Mellado. Un militar del siglo XX (1912-1995). Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1997.
- Ros Agudo, Manuel. La guerra secreta de Franco (1939-1945). Barcelona: Crítica, 2002.
- Rovira, Juan José. "Franco y la política exterior." El legado de Franco. Madrid: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 1992.
- Rubottom, R. Richard and Murphy, J. Carter. Spain and the United States Since World War II. New York: Praeger, 1984.
- Smith, Tony. America's Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Viñas, Angel, *et al.* Política comercial exterior en España, 1931-1975. Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979.
- Viñas, Angel. Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía. Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981.
- Viñas, Angel. En las garras del aguila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe Gonzalez (1945-1995). Barcelona: Crítica, 2003.